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We investigate how the employment-based health insurance system in the U.S. affects individuals'
life-cycle health-care decisions. We take the viewpoint that health is a form of human capital that affects
workers' productivities on the job, and derive implications of employees' turnover on the incentives
to undertake health investment. Our model suggests that employee turnovers lead to dynamic inefficiencies
in health investment, and particularly, it suggests that employment-based health insurance system
in the U.S. might lead to an inefficient low level of individual health during individuals' working ages.
Moreover, we show that under-investment in health is positively related to the turnover rate of the
workers' industry and increases medical expenditure in retirement. We provide empirical evidence
for the predictions of the model using two data sets, the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS)
and the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). In MEPS, we find that employers in industries with high
turnover rates are much less likely to offer health insurance to their workers. When employers offer
health insurance, the contracts have higher deductibles and employers' contribution to the insurance
premium is lower in high turnover industries. Moreover, workers in high turnover industries have
lower medical expenditure and undertake less preventive care. In HRS, instead we find that individuals
who were employed in high turnover industries have higher medical expenditure when retired. The
magnitude of our estimates suggests significant degree of intertemporal inefficiencies in health investment
in the U.S. as a result of the employment-based health insurance system. We also evaluate and cast
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The United States is unique among industrialized nations in that it lacks a national health
insurance system.1 The U.S. health insurance system is a mixture of private and public insurances
with the private insurance playing a much more dominant role than the rest of the industrialized
world. More speci￿cally, in the U.S. most of the working age populations obtain health insurance
coverage through their employers, while elderly individuals aged 65 or over are almost uniformly
enrolled in Medicare.2; 3
In this paper, we investigate how the employment-based health insurance system in the U.S.
a￿ects individuals’ life-cycle health-care decisions. We take the viewpoint that health is a general
form of human capital that a￿ects workers’ productivities on the job, and derive implications of
employees’ turnover on the incentives to undertake health investment. Our model suggests that
employee turnovers lead to dynamic ine￿ciencies in health investment, and particularly, it suggests
that employment-based health insurance system in the U.S. might lead to an ine￿cient low level of
individual health investment during individuals’ working ages. The economic mechanism we explore
is closely related to Acemoglu and Pischke (1998, 1999), and it is best explained if we imagine that
workers and ￿rms separate at an exogenous rate. Frictional labor markets imply that if a worker-
￿rm pair separates in the future with some positive probability, the pair will not be able to capture
the entire surplus generated by their current health investment. Moreover, the higher is the industry
turnover, the more likely is the surplus loss. As a result, the ￿rm/worker pair in industries with
higher turnover rates has lower incentives to invest in health. This simple comparative statics
prediction can be extended to allow for endogenous turnover rates. When industries di￿er in the
skills used by their workers, industries with more speci￿c skills have endogenously lower turnover
rates, and thus workers’ health investment is higher.
1Among 30 OECD countries, Mexico, Turkey and the United States are the only countries without universal or
near universal health insurance coverage.
2According to the estimates of Kaiser Commission and the Urban Institute, in 2003, 62% of non-elderly Americans
received private employer-sponsored insurance, 5% purchased insurance on the private non-group (individual) market;
15% were enrolled in public insurance programs (mainly Medicaid), and 18% were uninsured (see Ho￿man and
Holahan, 2005).
3The employment-based health insurance system originated as a ￿rm response to the World War II era wage
control and labor shortage, and was maintained over time due to powerful political forces representing the medical
profession (see Campion 1986 or Richmond and Fein 2005 for historical accounts of the employment based health
insurance system).
1The model also shows that the level of employers’ contribution to workers’ health investment
is higher in lower turnover industries. The reason is that lower worker turnover implies that ￿rms
will be able to obtain higher expected pro￿ts in periods after the health investment is made,
thus ex ante ￿rm competition for workers will lead the ￿rms to pay for a larger share of the
workers’ health investment. Moreover, a simple extension of the model where we introduce a
\retirement" period subsequent to the working career shows an interesting intertemporal reversal
of the ranking of the medical expenditures: individuals who worked in lower turnover industries
have higher medical expenditure when working, but lower medical expenditure when retired. This
latter prediction suggests that employment-based health insurance system in the U.S. might lead
to ine￿cient patterns of health expenditures during individuals’ life-cycle. Indeed, the U.S. health
expenditure accounts for about 17 percent of its GDP in 2005, while in UK health expenditures
account for about 8 percent of its GDP. More importantly, the share of health expenditures by
retirees in UK is much lower than that in the U.S. (see Davis et. al 2007).
We provide extensive empirical evidence consistent with the predictions of the model using
two datasets, the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) and the Health and Retirement
Study (HRS). We deal with the potential reverse causality of health insurance on job turnover
rates using two empirical strategies. The ￿rst empirical strategy, presented in the main text,
follows naturally from our model with endogenous turnover: we use an exogenous measure of the
importance of speci￿c skills in each industry constructed from a variable called Speci￿c Vocational
Preparation (SVP) for each occupation in the Dictionary of Occupation Titles (DOT) collected by
the Department of Labor.4 In Appendix C we also provide very similar results from an alternative
empirical strategy where we use turnover rates in corresponding U.K. industries as instruments.
Using these empirical strategies, in MEPS we ￿nd that individuals currently working in industries
with higher turnover rates are much less likely to be o￿ered health insurance; conditional on
being o￿ered health insurance, the contracts o￿ered to workers in higher turnover industries are
less comprehensive (higher deductibles), but employees’ premia are higher and employers pay a
lower share of total insurance premia. Moreover, workers in higher turnover industries spend less
in health care and are less likely to undertake preventive care. As predicted by the model, we
also ￿nd that health care expenditure di￿erences when working have predicted consequences on
4The average SVP score we constructed for each industray is called ASVP. See Section 4.3 for details about how
industry ASVP is constructed from SVPs of the occupations. The ASVP we constructed range from a low of 3.017
in 3-digit industry 722 (Business and Repair Services: Services to Dwellings and Other Buildings) to a high of 6.949
in 3-digit industry 893 (Professional and Related Services: Miscellaneous Professional and Related Services).
2health expenditures in retirement. Using the 2002 wave of HRS, we ￿nd that the retirees’ medical
expenditure is higher for workers whose industry of longest tenure prior to retirement has higher
turnover rates.
The magnitudes of some of our results deserve special mention. During the working years,
individuals working in industries where skills are one standard deviation more speci￿c have higher
medical expenditure by about $100 per year.5 For individuals over 65 years old, individuals whose
job with longest tenure was in industries whose ASVPs are one standard-deviation higher have
lower medical expenditure by about $850 per year. Using these estimates, we can perform the
very rough back-of-the-envelope calculation to compare the life-time medical expenditures of two
workers whose only di￿erence is the industry in which they work. Suppose both individuals work
about 50 years in the same industries and then are retired for 15 years before dying, but the ￿rst
individual works in an industry whose ASVP is one standard-deviation higher than the second
one. According to our estimates, during the working years the ￿rst worker’ cumulative health
expenditure is on average $5,000 higher than the health expenditure of the second worker. During
the retirement years, the ￿rst worker’s health expenditure is instead more than $12,000 lower than
the second individual’s. The total di￿erence is around $7,000, which is a rather large di￿erence.
This rough calculation suggests that every additional dollar of health expenditure during working
years may lead to about 2.5 dollars of savings in retirement!
The above calculation is clearly rough as it did not incorporate discounting, did not make
adjustment for di￿erences in life qualities and life expectancies for the two individuals, nonetheless
it suggests that in the typical life of U.S. individuals, too much of their health expenditures are
allocated toward their retirement ages. This observation, of course, is not new;6 what is new is that
our paper provides a causal link between the unique employment-based health insurance system in
the U.S. and this relatively well-known empirical observation. Our ￿nding that an additional dollar
of health expenditure during one’s working ages can translate into more than two dollars of health
expenditure savings during retirement suggests that it is possible to reduce the total health care
5In our data, ASVP scores among 3-digit industries have a mean of about 5.2 with a standard deviation of about
0.83. As an example, 3-digit industry 500 (Wholesale Trade: Motor Vehicles and Equipment) has an ASVP score of
about 5.1; 3-digit industry 701 (Finance, Insurance and Real Estate: Savings Institution, including Credit Union) has
an ASVP score of 5.85, about one standard deviation above that of industry 500. The industry 592 (Retail Trade:
Variety Stores) has an ASVP score of 4.2, about one standard deviation lower than that of industry 500.
6For example, see Davis et al. (2007), for the observation that preventive care expenditures in the U.S. were too
low relative to those in other OECD countries.
3expenditures in the U.S. without hurting Americans’ health, if one could ￿nd a way to internalize
the dynamic externalities intrinsic in health care investment.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature; Section
3 provides a simple theoretical framework and derive its testable implications; Section 4 describes
the data sets we use in our empirical analysis; Section 5 describes our empirical framework; Section
6 describes our results from the MEPS data about currently active workers; Section 7 presents
collaborating evidence from retirees in the HRS; Section 8 presents falsi￿cation results using U.K.
data; Section 9 discusses alternative hypotheses; and ￿nally Section 10 concludes. Appendix A
contains the proof of Proposition 1; Appendix B provides information about the SVP variable; and
Appendix C contains empirical results from an alternative empirical strategy using the turnover
rates in corresponding industries in U.K.
2 Related literature
First and foremost, our paper is related to the vast literature on the general and speci￿c human
capital investments. The connection to this literature is immediate because we consider health as a
form of general human capital.7 The classical theory of human capital developed by Becker (1962,
1964) distinguishes between investments in general-usage and speci￿c human capital based on the
transferability of the acquired skills when a worker switches ￿rms. To the extent that healthy
workers are more productive in all ￿rms, health investment is quite plausibly a form of general
investment (see Grossman 2000).
One of the most celebrated results in the classical theory of human capital is that in a frictionless
and competitive labor market, workers capture all the returns to their general human capital
investment; thus, investment in general human capital will be e￿cient and the investment will
be solely paid for by the workers as the employers obtain no return from paying for investment
in these skills.8 An important theoretical literature, largely due to Acemoglu and Pischke (1998,
1999), attempts to explain the empirical phenomenon that ￿rms seem to pay for general training of
7The economics literature of health as human capital starts with Grossman (1972). See Grossman (2000) for a
comprehensive survey.
8In contrast, employers will share the returns and the cost of investment in ￿rm-speci￿c skills with their employees.
See, for example, Hashimoto (1981) for an analysis of the determination of how speci￿c human capital investment
will be shared by the worker and the employer.
4their employers, which is inconsistent with the predictions of the classical human capital theory.9
They show that when labor market frictions lead to \wage compression," then ￿rms may pay for
investments in the general skills of their employers.10; 11 The compression in the wage structure
transforms the \technologically" general skills into de facto \speci￿c" skills, thus providing ￿rms
with incentives to invest in their workers’ general skills. Even though Acemoglu and Pischke’s
theoretical models also yield testable predictions about the level of total general human capital
investment, this literature has almost exclusively focused on the issue of why ￿rms share the cost
of general training.
Taking the view that health is a form of general human capital, our paper can also be considered
as an empirical analysis of how ￿rms and workers invest in general human capital. In fact, we believe
that health expenditure is particularly suited to study how ￿rms and workers jointly determine the
level of general human capital investment. The reason is that health expenditure is typically well
recorded, as most health investment is provided by third-party medical professionals with well-
documented charges. In contrast, for almost all other investments in general human capital, it is
quite di￿cult to obtain a quantitative measure of total costs and each party’s contribution; in these
situations, it is often the case that only ￿rms’ general training expenditures may be recorded while
worker’s contribution to general investment is typically unobserved.
Second, this paper is related to the literature on the dynamic ine￿ciency in the insurance market
(Hendel and Lizzeri 2003, Crocker and Moran 2003 and Finkelstein, McGarry and Su￿ 2005). The
nature of dynamic ine￿ciency in that literature di￿ers from ours. It refers to the ine￿ciency arising
when short-term insurance contracts do not o￿er consumers the coverage of the risk of a change in
their risk type as a result of their inability to commit to long-term insurance contracts.12
To some extent, the dynamic ine￿ciency in our analysis is also related to the inability of workers
9However, recent papers by Balmaceda (2005) and Kessler and L￿ ulfesmann (2006) showed that under some surplus
sharing rules the speci￿c and general human capital will endogenously interact so that even the labor market is
competitive, the employer may choose to contribute to workers’ general training.
10Acemoglu and Pischke (1998, 1999) consider many potential forms of market frictions, including search friction,
asymmetric information, complementarity between general and speci￿c skills, etc.
11More explicitly, in Acemoglu and Pischke (1998, 1999), the wage structure is compressed if the di￿erence between
a worker’s productivity in his current ￿rm and his outside wage option is an increasing function of his level of general
human capital.
12Diamond (1992) mentioned that the lack of long-term health insurance is an important market failure. Cochrane
(1995) showed that time consistent health insurance contracts with severance payments can fully insure consumers
with the reclassi￿cation risk with a string of short term contracts (see also Pauly, Kunreuther and Hirth 1995).
5to commit to long-term employment with the ￿rm. In this literature, our paper is closer to Crocker
and Moran (2003), who argue that workers in industries with higher speci￿c-skill requirement are
more committed to their ￿rms and thus they should be provided with higher quantity of insurance.
Our empirical analysis borrows the measurement of industry-speci￿c skills from Crocker and Moran
(2003), so it is important to highlight the di￿erences between our paper and their paper. First,
the focus is di￿erent: our paper focuses on health investment and health consumption, while their
paper focuses purely on insurance. Second, their theory is silent about many aspects that we
investigate empirically. In particular, our model makes clear predictions about how ￿rms and
workers share health expenditure, and our empirical analysis con￿rms the theoretical predictions.
Third, we speci￿cally investigate characteristics of health care plans that are more directly related
to consumption of medical care, such as the deductible. Forth, we ￿nd that workers in low turnover
industries have a lower variance of medical expenditure,13 which is in contrast to their idea that
pooling equilibria are more likely in low turnover industries. Fifth, we ￿nd that workers in low
turnover industries are healthier, as predicted by our model of consumption and in contrast to their
model of insurance. We will come back to these di￿erent implications in Section 9 when we discuss
alternative hypotheses.
Third, our paper is related to the literature on the interactions between public and private in-
surance. For example, Brown and Finkelstein (2004) studied the interaction of the public Medicaid
program with the private market for long-term care insurance. Their estimate suggest that the
incomplete provision of long term care in Medicaid has a large crowding-out e￿ect on the demand
for long term care insurance in the private market. While their paper considers the contemporane-
ous interaction between the public and private insurance for long term care in terms of insurance
takeup decisions, the interaction we consider is intertemporal and it is about health investment
behavior instead of insurance takeup.
More generally, our paper provides a strong link between the institutional features of the U.S.
health care market, the incentives to invest in health it generates, and health outcomes. As in
Grossman’s (1972) seminal contribution and a number of more recent papers (Murphy and Topel
2005, Hall and Jones 2007), our paper focuses on the consumption/investment aspect of health care
plans versus the insurance aspect. Standard contracts bundle regular medical care (i.e. care for
frequent and common treatment) with pure insurance (i.e. protection against low probability and
13See subsection 6.3 for the empirical ￿nding.
6high cost events).14 However, in contrast to these papers, our paper delves deeper into the incentives
generated by the institutional arrangements that govern health care, especially employer-provided
health insurance and the interaction between private and public insurance.
Fourth, our paper is related to the literature on health insurance and \job locks." A large
literature, for example, Madrian (1994), Gruber and Madrian (1994, 1997) and summarized in
Gruber and Madrian (2002), examine how employer-provided health insurance may lead workers to
keep jobs they would rather leave for fear of losing insurance coverage for preexisting conditions. For
example, Madrian (1994) estimates the extent of job-lock using a di￿erence-in-di￿erence approach,
i.e., the job mobility di￿erential between those with high and low expected medical expenses should
be greater for those with employer-provided health insurance than those for whose job do not include
insurance. Our paper, to some extent, could be thought of as an investigation on the ￿rms’ decisions
to provide health insurance, and health care in general, to their employees. In Section 9, we also
provide some preliminary attempt to distinguish the \job lock" hypothesis from the mechanisms
we explore in this paper.
We would also like to note that in a related paper, Herring (2006) argued that the free-riding
problem between private insurers because of enrollee’s turnover may reduce insurer incentives to
provide socially-optimal levels of preventive care. Using data from the Community Tracking Study’s
Household Survey and a market-level measures of employment-induced insurer turnover, he found
that turnover has a signi￿cantly negative e￿ect on the utilization of preventive services and no
e￿ect on the utilization of acute services. While closely related, our identi￿cation strategy di￿ers
from Herring’s. Herring relies on the market-level di￿erences in turnover rates; and ours rely on
the cross-industry di￿erences in turnover rates resulting from the di￿erences in the importance of
speci￿c skills in their production functions. Also related, Cebul et. al (2007) provided evidence that
higher insurance turnover will lead to under-investment in health, using data from the Community
Tracking Study and from the administrative records of an insurance company. Our paper di￿ers
from theirs in that we focus on labor market turnover while they focus on the turnover in the
insurance carriers.
14The recent introduction of health savings account (HSA) in part breaks the link between consumption
and insurance. HSAs are tax-favored savings accounts that can be used to pay for medical expenditures,
combined with high-deductible health insurance plans. According to the U.S. Department of the Treasury
(http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/public-affairs/hsa/), in the year 2005 already 3.2 million individuals were
covered by HSA type insurance, and the ￿gure is projected to be 25 to 30 million people in the year 2010 .
73 A Simple Theoretical Framework
In this section we present a simple model of health care consumption. The model draws heavily
from Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) frictional labor market. The goal of the model is to capture
in the simplest way the e￿ect of worker’s turnover on health investment incentives. We start by
making the simplest assumptions to capture the externality we described in the Introduction, and
we then gradually enrich the framework to allow for more realistic features of the labor market.
3.1 Environment
There are two periods with no discounting. Health is a form of general human capital and thus
is an input in the production function of the worker. We assume that health is the only input in
the production function f (h); where f (￿) is assumed to be increasing, di￿erentiable and concave.
All workers are risk neutral, are endowed with an initial stock of health h1 and can, in the ￿rst
period, invest m1 in health at a unit cost p. Health evolves according to
h2 = k(h1;m1)
where k is the health function, which we assume to be continuous and increasing in the stock of
health h1 and in the investment in health m1; i.e. @k=@h1 > 0 and @k=@m1 > 0:
In the second period, the ￿rm and the worker may receive, with probability q 2 (0;1); an
adverse shock that will for sure end their relationship, in which event the worker gets an outside
wage of v (h2) and the ￿rm gets a surplus of zero; with the remaining probability 1 ￿ q; they can
continue their productive relationship in which event the worker must decide whether to stay with
the ￿rm at wage w2 (h2), to be endogenously determined, or to quit and obtains an outside wage
of v (h2); which is assumed to be exogenous. It is important to note that, if the worker decides
to leave her current ￿rm (either due to exogenous end of their productive relationship, or due to
quitting), her productivity at other ￿rms remain f (h2) to re￿ect our assumption that health is
a form of general human capital; however she is able to receive a wage v (h2) from other ￿rms,
re￿ecting the labor market frictions.15 Of course, it is natural to assume that v (h2) < f (h2); but
the more important assumption is v0 (￿) < f0 (￿); which Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) termed wage
compression assumption.16
15See Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) for a variety of mechanisms that can lead to a wedge between f (h2); the
worker’s productivity, and v (h2); her wage, at other ￿rms.
16The wage compression assumption is needed for the result below that equilibrium health investment is suboptimal
8We follow Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) full-competition regime, where ￿rms compete in the ￿rst
period by o￿ering a pair of wage and medical consumption fw1;m1g to workers, and in equilibrium
they make zero pro￿ts.
3.2 Equilibrium
To begin, note that if the worker and the current ￿rm are not exogenously separated, they
have a surplus f (h2) ￿ v (h2) to share from continuing the employment relationship relative to
separating, where f (h2) and v (h2) are respectively the total surpluses from continuing and from
separating. We assume that the surplus is divided according to the Nash Bargaining solution where
￿ 2 (0;1) represents the worker’s bargaining power, the wage w2 (h2) that the worker obtains if
he/she does not quit will be:
w2 (h2) = (1 ￿ ￿)v (h2) + ￿f (h2):
Thus, the ￿rm’s expected pro￿t in period two is:
￿2 (h2) = (1 ￿ q)[f (h2) ￿ w2 (h2)]
= (1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ ￿)[f (h2) ￿ v (h2)];
and that in the ￿rst period is:
￿1 (h1) = f (h1) ￿ w1 ￿ pm1;
where w1 is the worker’s ￿rst period wage and m1 is the worker’s ￿rst period medical expenditure,
both to be determined in equilibrium.
The sum of pro￿ts for the ￿rm in the two periods (recall the no-discounting assumption for
simplicity) is thus:
￿ = ￿1 (h1) + ￿2 (h2) = f (h1) ￿ w1 ￿ pm1 + (1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ ￿)[f (h2) ￿ v (h2)]: (1)
Ex ante competition among ￿rms for workers will entail that the ￿rm chooses m1 and w1 to
maximize ￿ above subject to the constraint that workers receive as much utility as that o￿ered by
other ￿rms U; i.e.,
w1 + (1 ￿ q)[(1 ￿ ￿)v (h2) + ￿f (h2)] + qv (h2) ￿ U; (2)
where competition among ￿rms for the worker ensures that the utility level U is high enough such
that in equilibrium ￿ = ￿1 (h1) + ￿2 (h2) = 0:
relative to the ￿rst best (see Section 3.2 below).
9Now, from (2), we have that in equilibrium
w1 = U ￿ f(1 ￿ q)[(1 ￿ ￿)v (h2) + ￿f (h2)] + qv (h2)g: (3)
Substituting (3) into (1) and maximizing over m1;we know that the equilibrium level of medical
expenditure m￿
1 must solve the following ￿rst order condition:
￿
qv0 (k(h1;m￿






1 is determined, the equilibrium wage w￿
1 can be obtained from the zero pro￿t condition
for the ￿rm, i.e.,
w￿
1 = f (h1) ￿ pm￿
1 + (1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ ￿)[f (k(h1;m￿
1)) ￿ v (k(h1;m￿
1))]: (5)
Equations (4) and (5) show the key features of the model. First, equation (4) shows that, unless
there is never separation (q = 0), investment in health is socially ine￿cient. To see this, note that
the e￿cient level of health investment, denoted by ^ m1;must solve




which equates the marginal social bene￿t of medical expenditure f0 (k(h1; ^ m1))@k=@m1 to its
marginal cost p: Note that the social bene￿t from health investment is determined by the worker’s
productivity f (h2) which is independent of the employer of the worker, re￿ecting the nature of
health as a form of general capital. Because of the wage compression assumption that v0 (￿) < f0 (￿),
comparison of (4) and (6) reveals that equilibrium health investment m￿
1 is, investment is lower
than the socially e￿cient level ^ m1.
Second, equation (5) shows that the employer and the worker share medical expenditure m￿
1.
In the competitive and frictionless labor market model with no frictions (Becker 1962, 1964), we
have f (￿) = v (￿), thus m￿
1 = ^ m1 and the ￿rst period wage adjusts to w￿
1 = f (h1) ￿ pm￿
1; i.e., the
worker pays the full cost of the investment in health. The reason is, of course, that in a competitive
labor market, the worker earns the full return of investment in health in the form of a higher future
wage, and thus the worker pays the full cost of this investment in the form of a lower ￿rst period
wage. In contrast in a frictional labor market where v (￿) < f (￿); the employer earns in the future a
fraction of the return of the current investment in health of the worker, and thus the employer must
share the cost of worker’ current investment by paying a salary higher than f (h1) ￿ pm￿
1. Thus,
w￿
1 ￿[f (h1) ￿ pm￿
1] measures the amount of worker’s health expenditure paid by the employer. (Of
course, f (h1) ￿ w￿
1 is the worker’s contribution to the health expenditure.)
10Proposition 1 below highlights the key comparative statics of this simple model that we use in
the empirical analysis. Its proof is provided in Appendix A.
Proposition 1 A decrease in the (exogenous) turnover rate q will:
(i) increase equilibrium health expenditure m￿
1;
(ii) increase the amount of health expenditure paid by the employer w￿
1 ￿ [f (h1) ￿ pm￿
1].
3.3 Speci￿c Capital and Endogenous Turnover
In the model of the previous subsection, the turnover probability q was exogenously ￿xed.
Obviously in many real cases employees decide to leave employers and thus turnover is endogenously
determined. We now consider a simple extension of the previous framework that incorporates
endogenous turnover. The main new mechanism is the introduction of ￿rm-speci￿c human capital.
This extension is particularly important for us because a measure of industry-speci￿c human capital
provided by the Department of Labor is the main variable that we use to proxy for industry turnover
rates in our empirical analysis.17
We assume that there is a continuum of industries and industries di￿er in the importance of
speci￿c capital. In industry i the production function of a worker is
yi = f (h;si)
where si are skills speci￿c to industry i: a worker moving to a di￿erent industry can transfer only
a fraction (1 ￿ i) of his skills si, so that a higher indexed industry i has more speci￿c skills. For
simplicity, assume that the level of skills si is acquired during the ￿rst period that the employee
spends with the employer via a learning mechanism as in Jovanovic (1979), and that the level si is
equal across all industries.18
To have endogenous turnover in the model, we assume that in the second period the worker can
approach another ￿rm at no cost. The new ￿rm and the worker draw a match speci￿c productivity
17Related models where speci￿c capital and turnover rates are endogenously modelled can be found in Chang and
Wang (1995, 1996). They focus on the role of asymmetric information where current employers are assumed to know
more about workers’ productivity than potential employers.
18In an earlier version of the paper, we have analyzed a model in which speci￿c skills si are endogenously accumu-
lated at some cost, controlled by the employer in order to a￿ect the worker’s turnover rate. All results go through
under the assumption that the complementarities between general and speci￿c skills di￿er by industries according to
the importance of speci￿c skills in the production functions. Details are available from the authors upon request.
11shock ￿ from the distribution G(￿): Production in the new ￿rm yn
2 is equal to
yn
2 = f (h2;(1 ￿ i)si) + ￿
In the new ￿rm, the worker and the employer divide the surplus according to the Nash bargaining
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which is decreasing in i: Thus, the introduction of ￿rm speci￿c human capital makes turnover
endogenous. Together with our results in the previous subsection, we conclude that industries with
more speci￿c skills (higher i) have (endogenously) lower turnover rate and higher health investment.
3.4 Dynamics of Health Expenditure
In order to understand how health investment early in life a￿ects health expenditure at older
ages, we now assume that there is also a third period in which the individual is retired. In the third
period, the utility of the individual depends on domestic production and the production function
is d(h3); with d0 (￿) > 0 and d00 (￿) < 0. Assume now that health evolves according to
ht = k(ht￿1;mt￿1)
with the additional assumption that current health is a concave function of past health @2ht=@h2
t￿1 <
0: Assume also that the individual bears the full cost of second period medical expenditure m2:19
19We could intriduce a Government that pays for medical expenditure in the third period as in Medicare and ￿nances
expenditure through taxation. If taxes were non-distortionary and there were no moral hazard, the allocation would
be identical to the allocation considered here.
12In this scenario, it is easy to show that the lower the medical expenditure m1 is in the ￿rst period,
the higher is expenditure m2 in the second period. Thus, combining the relationship between m1
and m2 derived here with the relationship between ￿rm speci￿c capital and medical expenditure
m1; we should expect that workers in industries with more speci￿c human capital should have a
higher medical expenditure during the early career, but a lower medical expenditure latter in life.
3.5 Summary of Empirical Implications
We believe the model highlights in a simple and realistic way the interactions between general
and speci￿c human capital in modern labor markets. To summarize, our model makes the following
predictions:
1. Employers pay a higher amount of workers’ health expenditure in lower turnover industries
(industries with more speci￿c human capital);
2. Individuals that are employed in lower turnover industries (industries with more speci￿c
human capital) have higher health expenditure when working;
3. Individuals that were employed in lower turnover industries have lower health expenditure
when retired.
3.6 Discussion of Modelling Assumptions
We made a set of simplifying assumptions in our model in order to present the basic economic
mechanism that we test in our empirical analysis. The model could be extended to incorporate many
additional features at a cost of complication. For example, we abstracted away from risk aversion to
focus on health care consumption (instead of insurance), which also led us to assume a deterministic
health production function. It is worth emphasizing that we can relax these restrictions as long as
we continue to assume frictional labor market.
The key assumption of frictional labor market is itself a reduced form assumption that can result
from many di￿erent underlying mechanisms. For example, it could be arise from search frictions
(it takes time to be matched with a new employer); it could result from asymmetric information
regarding workers’ true productivity; and it could be due to institutional restrictions on hiring and
￿ring.20
20See Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) for elaborations on these potential mechanisms that can give rise to labor
market frictions.
134 Data
The goal of the empirical analysis is to measure the impact of job attachment on health insurance
coverage, health status and use of medical care services at di￿erent points in an individual’s life to
document the dynamic externality predicted by our model.
We use three distinct sources of data in our empirical analysis. We obtain data on health
insurance coverage, health status and use of medical care services for employed individuals from the
Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), and for retired individuals from the Health Retirement
Survey (HRS). We further construct a proxy measure of current (for employed individuals) and
past (for retired individuals) job attachment at the 3-digit industry level using from the 1991
Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) following the procedure outlined by Crocker and Moran
(2003) described below. We then match this proxy to each worker’ 3-digit industry in the MEPS
to investigate how current job attachment a￿ects current health care consumption for employed
individuals, and to the 3-digit industry of the longest reported job in the HRS to investigate how
past job attachment a￿ects current health care consumption for retired individuals.
We now describe each dataset used. Since both MEPS and HRS are large, publicly available
datasets, we only describe them brie￿y here and refer to their respective websites21 for a more
thorough description.
4.1 MEPS
MEPS is a set of large-scale surveys of families and individuals, their medical providers, and
employers across the United States. It is conducted to provide nationally representative estimates
of health care use, expenditures, sources of payment, and insurance coverage for the U.S. civilian
non-institutionalized population.
MEPS has two major components: the Household Component (HC) and the Insurance Com-
ponent (IC). HC is a household survey. It provides data from individual households and their
members, which is supplemented by data from their medical providers. HC collects detailed infor-
mation for each person in the household on demographic characteristics, health conditions, health
status, use of medical services, charges and source of payments, access to care, satisfaction with
care, health insurance coverage, income, and employment. The data report the 3-digit codes of
21The MEPS is available at http://www.meps.ahrq.gov. The HRS is available at
http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu.
14industry and occupation of the individual.22
IC is an establishment survey. It collects information on the employer’s health plan o￿erings.
There are two distinct samples ￿elded in the MEPS IC survey: the List sample and the Link sample.
These samples are designed to address di￿erent survey goals, but the two have been combined to
make data collection more e￿cient. The List sample is an independently drawn, nationwide sample
of establishments and state/local governments. The List sample is not linked to the MEPS-HC
survey. The Link sample is a sample of employers that are identi￿ed by respondents in the HC
as their main employer and source of their health insurance. Employers of MEPS HC jobholders
are contacted and are asked about health plan o￿erings, premia, employee contributions to premia
and other plan details for their establishment as a whole. This information is then linked to data
collected in HC for the jobholder to provide a more complete picture of the jobholder’s health plan
options. The health plan questions are asked for each o￿ered plan, up to a maximum of four.23 We
use in our analysis the IC Link sample only, since we can link it to the HC and thus to employee’s
characteristics and employee’s consumption of medical care. It is important to note here that the
IC Link is a selected sample, i.e. we observe plan characteristics only for those ￿rms that o￿er
health plans to their employees. In the sequel, for simplicity we will refer to the IC Link sample as
the IC.
In our analysis we use MEPS data from the 1998 survey.
4.2 HRS
The HRS began as a panel survey of a nationally representative sample of people aged 51 to
61 in 1992, including their spouses, with oversamples of blacks, Hispanics and residents of Florida.
This original cohort (wave 1) has been re-interviewed every other year since then. In 1998 the
sample was supplemented with both older and younger cohorts. A total of 6 waves are available.
The HRS is thus particularly well-suited to a study of health expenditure of retired individuals.
It contains detailed information about current and past health status of respondents, along with rich
data on their job history, and information about economic and demographic variables, including
education, income, and wealth. Starting from wave 3, the survey asks questions about total medical
expenditures. In some waves, a continuous value is reported, while in other waves a series of
unfolding bracket questions are asked. Based on these brackets (and some additional variables),
22The 3-digit codes and the IC are restricted from public access.
23Most companies do not o￿er more than four plans.
15the RAND Corporation imputes a continuous value of total medical expenditure in each waves,
and this is the dependent variable that we use in our empirical analysis.
The HRS also asks questions on the employment history of the individual. A respondent is asked
about past jobs retrospectively at his/her ￿rst interview. From these questions, we can reconstruct
the years of tenure at the longest reported job and, most importantly for our purposes, the 3-digit
industry codes of the longest tenure job.24
We use HRS data from the 2002 wave only, which was the last wave available when we started
this project. The main reason to use the last HRS wave is that individuals are older, which allows
us to investigate more thoroughly the long-term dynamics of health expenditure.
4.3 DOT
To proxy for job attachment, we use a measure from the DOT of the training speci￿city required
in various occupations. The variable, known as \Speci￿c Vocational Preparation" (SVP) is de￿ned
as \the amount of time required to learn the techniques, acquire information, and develop the
facility needed for average performance in a speci￿c job-worker situation" (U.S. Department of
Labor 1991) and is based on the nine categories of vocational preparation. Appendix B describes
in more details these categories.
We construct a proxy for worker-level job attachment by imputing an SVP value to each in-
dividual either in the MEPS or in the HRS. We follow the procedure described by Crocker and
Moran (2003). Basically, the procedure follows these two steps:
1. The SVP varies by occupation as de￿ned by the DOT and the DOT provides a ￿ner occu-
pational classi￿cation than the Census, so there were often multiple SVP values associated
with each Census occupation code. To impute a unique SVP value to each Census occupation
code, we took a simple average of the SVP values associated with each Census occupation.
In summary, the ￿rst step generates a measure of job attachment at the 3-digit Census
occupation level from the DOT occupation classi￿cation.
2. In order to construct a measure of job attachment at the ￿rm level, we compute the average
SVP value in each worker’s industry, labelled ASVP, by averaging the SVP values by industry
for all employed persons in the 1990 Census Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) (5%
24We actually use the longest tenure job and its associated industry code exactly as constructed by the RAND
corporation.
16sample). Since the industry codes in the MEPS and in the HRS are at the three-digit level,
representing some 240 distinct industries, we believe that ASVP is likely to provide a good
measure of the average amount of job attachment present in individual ￿rms.
In summary, the second step generates a measure of job attachment at the 3-digit Census
industry level from measure of job attachment at the 3-digit Census occupation level generated
in the ￿rst step averaging the SVP by occupation in each industry, where the average is taken
using the 5% sample from the Census.
High values of ASVP indicate high levels of industry-speci￿c human capital. Crocker and
Moran (2003) show that a higher industry ASVP value is a strong predictor of longer job tenure
at the ￿rm level, and of higher initial wage but slower wage growth, exactly as theories of speci￿c
human capital predict. Industries with the three lowest value of ASVP are \Services to dwellings"
(industry code 722), \Services to private households" (industry code 761) and \Taxicab service"
(industry code 402), all industries where common intuition suggests that speci￿c human capital
is not important. Industries with the highest value of ASVP are \Legal services" (industry code
841), \Engineering, architectural, and surveying services" (industry code 882) and \Miscellaneous
professional and related services" (industry code 892), and again common intuition suggests that
speci￿c human capital is rather important in these latter industries.
A ￿nal justi￿cation for our using industry instead of occupation as the basis of our analysis is
that most employers, when they provide health insurance bene￿ts to their employees, often o￿er
the same menu of plans to all of their workers, irrespective of their occupation. As such, it is the
turnover rates of all the occupations in their ￿rms that will impact the employers’ decision about
what bene￿ts to be included in their health insurance o￿erings.25
4.4 Summary Statistics
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the main variables of the MEPS sample and of the HRS
sample, respectively.
[Table 1 About Here]
25In principle, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) and its various amendments, did
not preclude the employers from providing di￿erent menus of health insurance bene￿ts to di￿erent set of workers.
But ￿rms do not do so because of concerns about equal treatment lawsuits.
17Table 1 shows that the workers in MEPS 1998 data averaged about 33.4 years, while those in
HRS 2002 averaged about 73.4 years; 51.6% of those in MEPS 1998 and 41% of those in HRS 2002
are male. In 1998 dollars, workers in MEPS 1998 spent about 2,025 dollars in medical expenditures,
while retirees in HRS 2002 spent about 8,903 dollars. About 64% of workers in MEPS 1998 were
o￿ered health insurance from their employers.
4.5 An Illustrative Comparison: Clerical Workers
Before proceeding to more formal tests of our hypotheses, in this subsection we present a simple
illustrative comparison. In particular, we compare the level of medical expenditure of one occu-
pation, clerical workers, across two one-digit industries { professional services and manufacturing
{ that have big di￿erences in our proxy for job attachment ASVP. More speci￿cally, the average
ASVP across 3-digit industries contained in the one-digit industry \professional services" is 5.9,
while it is 4.9 for \manufacturing."
[Table 2 About Here]
Table 2 simply compares the average medical expenditures for clerical workers during working
(in MEPS) and during retirement in the two industries (professional services v.s. manufacturing).
The comparison reveals that clerical workers in professional services have higher medical expendi-
ture while working, but lower medical expenditure when retired. Both di￿erences are statistically
as well as economically signi￿cant. In MEPS 1998 data, clerical workers working in industries
coded as \ Professional Services" spent about 1,662 dollars in medical expenditures, in contrast to
1,193 dollars for clerical workers working in industries coded as \Manufacturing." The two averages
are di￿erent from zero at a signi￿cance level of 3.9%. This ranking is reversed for clerical workers
during retirement: in HRS 2002, we ￿nd that clerical workers who worked primarily in industries
coded as \Professional Services" spent about 6,273 dollars, less than 8,777 dollars spent by those
who worked form \manufacturing." The di￿erence is signi￿cant at 6.3%.
While this evidence is clearly not conclusive, these numbers seem to uncover patterns consistent
with our hypotheses. The next section develops more sophisticated empirical strategies to test them.
5 Empirical Framework
We investigate employers’ o￿er and employees’ consumption of medical care by analyzing several
characteristics of employees’ health insurance contract and utilization of health care.
18The basic analysis in based on the following regression
yi = ￿ASVPi + ￿Xi + ￿i (9)
where yi is one of the several outcomes considered for individual i and Xi is a large set of control
variables. ASVPi is the key variable of interest. It is the Average Speci￿c Vocational Preparation
in the industry where individual i is currently working for currently employed workers or where
individual i spent the longest time working prior to retirement (for retirees). The coe￿cient of
ASVPi; ￿; measures the average e￿ect of our proxy for job attachment on the outcome yi, after
controlling for a large number of factors included in the vector Xi:26
Our dependent variables yi include several characteristics of the health care/insurance contract
o￿ered by the employers, several measures of consumptions of medical services by the individuals
and several measures of health status using the MEPS data and the HRS data. In particular, we
use the MEPS data to analyze: 1) O￿er of health care and health insurance. In particular, we
investigate whether the employer of individual i o￿ers health insurance; 2) for employers that o￿er
health insurance, the characteristics of the contract, such as premium, fraction of the premium paid
by the ￿rm, deductible, coinsurance rate; 2) consumption of medical care, such as annual medical
expenditure and annual medical charges (see later for the precise di￿erence between the two); 4)
consumption of preventive care and screening test. We include in the set Xi a large number of
controls that might a￿ect employers’ o￿ers of plans and employees’ choice among them. We include
employee’s age (also squared and cubed), education, size of the family, sex, annual income, race,
dummies for whether the individual lives in an MSA, dummies for di￿erent Census regions, and
employer’s total number of employees.
We later use HRS data to investigate retirees’ consumption of medical care (annual medical
expenditure). Ideally, we would like to include in the set of control variables Xi exactly the same
variables we used in our analysis of MEPS data. However, since the datasets are di￿erent, this is
not possible as some variables are coded di￿erently, or are simply not reported. In our analysis of
retirees’ expenditure on HRS data we thus control for individual’s age, education, sex, wealth, race
and marital status.
26In particular, we include ￿rm size in all of our regression in light of the well-known fact that small private
employers in the U.S. are less likely to o￿er health insurance to their employers (see Ellis and Ma 2005 for these facts
and an explanation.)
196 Results on Employees and Employers
6.1 O￿er of Insurance and Health Care
The simplest and most immediate test of our model is to investigate employers’ o￿er of medical
care/insurance. In Table 3 we present the result of a probit regression where the dependent variable
is equal to 1 if individual i is o￿ered health insurance by the employer of his current main job.
[Table 3 About Here]
As predicted by the model, Table 3 shows that the coe￿cient of AVSP is positive and signi￿cant.
Individuals working in industries with lower turnover - as proxied by a high ASVP value - are more
likely to be o￿ered health insurance by their employers. The magnitude of the coe￿cient is also
quite remarkable: a one unit change in ASVP (equal to 1.2 standard deviations) increases the
probability of being o￿ered health insurance by 5.8 percentage points, a rather large e￿ect. This
translates into a 9% increase in the employee’s likelihood of receiving insurance, since the fraction
of employees that receive insurance in the sample is 64%.
6.2 Characteristics of the Health Plans
The MEPS IC includes detailed data on characteristics of the health plans that employers
o￿er to their employees, such as whether there is a deductible, the amount of the deductible, the
fraction of the total premium paid by the employer, and the premium paid by the employee. We
now investigate how employees’ turnover, as proxied by ASVP, a￿ects plan’s characteristics. In
each regression, one observation is a single plan, so for each individual there might be multiple
plans. Moreover, as we mentioned in the description of the MEPS data in Subsection 4.1, the IC
sample is a selected sample and all regressions are not corrected for sample selection.27
[Table 4 About Here]
Table 4 reports the results of our regressions. We investigate in Column (1) whether the policy
has a deductible or not using a Probit regression; in Column (2) the amount of the deductible using
an ordered probit regression to take into account the bunching of deductible at a small number
27Sample selection should actually strengthen our results, since the unobservables that lead ￿rms to o￿er a health
plan should be positively correlated with the unobservables that lead ￿rms to o￿er more generous health plans.
Nonetheless, we are currently working on correcting the regressions for sample selection.
20of multiples of hundred dollars; in Column (3) the fraction of the total premium paid by the ￿rm
using a Tobit regression to take into account censoring at zero dollars (policy entirely paid by the
employee);28 in Column (4) employee’ annual contribution (the cost of the contract to the employee)
using a Tobit regression to take into account the censoring at zero dollars.
By and large, Table 4 shows that lower industry turnover{as proxied by higher ASVP{is as-
sociated more generous health insurance contracts that are not more costly for the employees.29
Individuals in lower turnover industries are o￿ered contracts that are less likely to have a deductible
or with lower overall individual deductible, but they pay a lower fraction of the total premium, and
they do not pay a higher level of premia for their coverage.
The magnitudes of the coe￿cients have also important economic signi￿cance. The probit re-
gression in Column (1) shows that a unit increase in ASVP decreases the probability that the policy
has a deductible by 5.5 percentage points. In the sample, 42% of contracts have a deductible, so a
5.5 points reduction means that a unit increase of ASVP decreases the likelihood that the contract
has a deductible by 13%. Similarly, the coe￿cient of ASVP in Column (2) suggests that a unit in-
crease in ASVP on average decreases by around $100. However, the dependent variable in Column
(2) has a lot of missing observations. The sample size drops from 11563 observations in Column
(1) to 2327 observations in Column (2), and this sample size drop suggests caution in interpreting
the results of the regression in Column (2).
Similarly, the results reported in Column (3) imply that a one unit increase in ASVP increases
the share of the total premium paid by the ￿rm by 2.5 percentage points, which is 3.5% of the
average premium paid by the ￿rm.
Overall, the evidence reported in this subsection indicates that employees working in lower
turnover industries receive more comprehensive medical coverage, but do not pay more, in line
with the predictions of our model.
6.3 Medical Expenditure
The ￿ndings of the previous subsection show that employees working in lower turnover indus-
tries pay less, but receive more comprehensive medical coverage. In this subsection we investigate
if more generous coverage indeed corresponds to higher medical expenditure. In particular, Propo-
28The fraction paid by the ￿rm could in principle be right-censored at 1 too. However, in the sample there is no
contract for which the ￿rm pays 100% of the total premium.
29One potentially interesting question is how employees characteristics are priced in the health insurance market.
21sition (1) of our simple model suggests that workers with higher job attachment should have more
incentives to invest in health. Thus, we investigate whether employees’ annual medical expenditure
is systematically correlated to our proxy for their job attachment ASVP.
In Tables 5a and 5b we present the results of several regressions that investigates employees’
consumption of health care using the MEPS HC data. In Column (1) and (3) of Table 5a the
dependent variable is total health care charges, while in Column (2) and (4) of Table 5a the
dependent variable is total health care expenditure. Table 5b is constructed similarly, but uses
instead the log of health care charges and the log of health care expenditures. The di￿erence
between charges and expenditures is that charges represent the sum of all fully established charges
for care received and usually does not re￿ect actual payments made for services, which can be
substantially lower due to factors such as negotiated discounts, bad debt, and free care. Instead,
expenditures refer to what is paid for health care services.
[Tables 5a and 5b About Here]
In Columns (1) and (2) we consider all individuals currently working, while in Columns (3) and
(4) we only consider individuals that are currently working and have obtained health insurance
through their job.30 Since the dependent variables are censored at zero expenditures and zero
charges, we employ Tobit regressions.31
Tables 5a and 5b show that individuals working in lower turnover industries have higher charges
and higher expenditures. This is true unconditionally, as Columns (1) and (2) show, but also
conditional on receiving health insurance through their job, as Columns (3) and (4) show. The
coe￿cients reported in Column 4 of Table 5a imply that a unit increase in ASVP increases annual
medical expenditure by around $113 dollars, or about 6% of the average medical expenditure, a
rather large e￿ect. The coe￿cient of ASVP reported in Column 4 of Table 5b is much bigger: it
would imply that a unit increase in ASVP increases annual medical expenditure by about 15%.
The di￿erence between the two coe￿cients indicates that individuals in low turnover industries
have higher average medical expenditure and also lower variance of medical expenditure,32 which
30This includes also a small number of people that have obtained insurance from a union. The regressions in
Column (3) and (4) are not corrected for selection.
31Results using Powell’s Censored Least Absolute Deviation (CLAD) are very similar and not reported.
32This is an immediate implication of Jensen’s inequality. The reason is that the log transformation of the dependent
variable changes the properties of the error term in a non-trivial way. See also Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006).
22is at odds with theories that suggest that a higher job attachment makes pooling health insurance
contracts more feasible (e.g., Crocker and Moran 2003).
6.4 Doctor Visits
The regressions of tables 5a and 5b show that individuals with higher job attachment have
higher medical expenditure. This could arise for two reasons: 1) they receive higher quality care; 2)
they receive higher quantity of care. Our simple model had no quality di￿erences, and we believe
it is important to separate these two alternative scenarios. It will also prove particularly useful
when in section 8 we compare medical care in the U.S. and the UK: in countries with national
health systems like the UK it is often di￿cult to have data on individual medical expenditure
since individuals do not pay for most medical care obtained; instead quantities of medical services
received are often well recorded.
Table 6 reports the coe￿cients of negative binomial regressions that investigate the number
medical provider visits.33 In columns (1) and (2) the dependent variable is the total number of
annual o￿ce-based visits; in columns (3) and (4) the dependent variable is the number of such
visits to physicians.34
The table clearly shows that individuals working in lower turnover industries visit a doctor
more frequently. This is true unconditionally, as columns (1) and (3) show, and also conditional on
receiving health insurance, as columns (2) and (4) show. The magnitudes of the coe￿cients imply
that a unit increase in ASVP is associated with a four percent increase in the number of annual
doctor visits, a considerable magnitude.
[Table 6 About Here]
6.5 Preventive Care
One of the most important components of health care is preventive care, which includes medical
decisions such as vaccinations, clinical preventive services delivered during periodic health exami-
33Medical provider visits consist of encounters that took place primarily in o￿ce-based settings and clinics. Care
provided in other settings such as a hospital, nursing home, or a person’s home are not included in this category.
34Total number of o￿ce visits is the sum of visits to physicians and nonphysicians. MEPS classi￿es the follow-
ing categories as nonphysicians: chiropractors, midwives, nurses and nurse practitioners, optometrists, podiatrists,
physician’s assistants, physical therapists, occupational therapists, psychologists, social workers, technicians, and
receptionists/clerks/secretaries.
23nations and private heal lifestyle decisions such as regular exercises and non-smoking. Preventive
care expenditure is by nature a forward-looking health investment (see Kenkel 2000 for an overview
of economic issues related to preventive care). Our model links the health investment individuals
make early in life to their later health outcomes. Early health investment reduces later health ex-
penditure, and we believe this simple mechanism could potentially have big welfare e￿ect. Medical
research has demonstrated that certain types of treatments, such as preventive care and screening
tests are critical in helping people live healthier lives. MEPS HC asks several questions about the
consumption of di￿erent screening tests, and in this subsection we investigate whether consumption
of these preventive care varies systematically with our proxy for job attachment ASVP.
In line with the recommendations of the Guide to Clinical Preventive Services (2006), we in-
vestigate whether individuals have received the following screening tests: pap smear for women
aged 18 and over; mammogram for women aged 40 and over; breast exam for women aged 35 and
over; cholesterol check for men aged 35 and over and women aged 40 and over. All the answers are
recorded in discrete categories that report how long ago the individual was tested. The categories
are: 1) Less than 1 year ago; 2) Between 1 and 2 years ago; 3) Between 2 and 5 years ago; 4) More
than years ago but not never; 5) Never.
[Tables 7a and 7b About Here]
Tables 7a reports the results of ordered probit regressions that investigate the probability of
having received the tests. Table 7b reports the results of probit regressions where the dependent
variable is equal to 1 if the individual has received the test within the last 2 years, and 0 otherwise.
Columns (1) to (4) of Table 7a and 7b report results for all individuals that meet the gender and
age restrictions, while Columns (5) to (8) report results only for those individuals that meet the
gender and age restriction that have obtained health insurance through their job.
Tables 7a and 7b show that individuals in lower turnover industries are unconditionally more
likely to receive screening tests. All coe￿cients of ASVP in Table 7a are negative and signi￿-
cantly di￿erent from zero. The point estimates of the coe￿cients are generally similar between
the Columns (1)-(4) and Columns (5)-(8). The signi￿cance of the coe￿cients decreases slightly,
but for all tests they remain signi￿cantly di￿erent from zero at the 10% level, providing strong
support for our hypothesis. The coe￿cients reported in Table 7b show similar results, although
now the coe￿cient of ASVP in the mammogram probit equation of Column (6) becomes insignif-
icant. Moreover, the results of the probit regressions of Table 7b mean that a unit increase in
24ASVP increases the probability that the individual has received the Pap Smear test by 2.2%, the
Mammogram by 3.2%, the Breast Exam by 3.3% and the Cholesterol Check by 2.5%, and these
magnitudes are very similar for individuals with and without insurance.
6.6 Health Status of Workers
MEPS also allows us to investigate individuals’ health outcomes. We think this is particular
important in the context of our theoretical framework, since in our simple model individuals make
health expenditure to improve their health status. Thus, studying health outcomes allows us to
establish a direct link between the previously documented health expenditure and health status,
corroborating the investment role of medical care.
MEPS HC reports a categorical indicator of self-reported health status, with 1 indicating \Ex-
cellent,", 2 for \Very Good", 3 for \Good", 4 for \Fair" and 5 for \Poor." Hence, we investigate
how industry ASVP is related to self-reported health using an ordered Probit regression. Table 8
reports the results. The coe￿cient of ASVP is negative and statistically signi￿cant, indicating that
workers in higher ASVP industries have better self-reported health, as predicted by our model.
[Table 8 About Here]
7 Results on Retirees
7.1 Medical Expenditure
We now investigate the long term consequences of lower investment in health during the working
career. More speci￿cally, we investigate empirically if lower health investments during the working
years lead to higher health expenditure during retirement using the HRS data. From a policy
perspective, we believe it is particularly important to understand if lower expenditure early in life
a￿ects government health expenditure through Medicare and other public insurance programs.
In Tables 9 we present the results of regressions that investigates retirees’ consumption of health
care using the HRS data. The sample considered in column (1) includes all individuals covered by
Medicare, while Column (2) includes all individuals covered by any government health insurance.
As the table shows, results across the two speci￿cations are pretty similar.
[Table 9 About Here]
25Table 9 shows that medical expenditure of the elderly is higher for individuals that were working
in high turnover industries, as predicted by our model. In particular, the value of the estimated
coe￿cients shows that an increase of one standard deviation of industry ASVP is on average
associated with an 800 dollars increase of retirees’ medical expenditure per year.35
Overall, we believe the magnitudes of the di￿erences in expenditure are substantial. Moreover,
based on this analysis on retirees’ expenditure and the previous analysis on workers’ expenditure, we
can perform the very rough back of the envelope calculation of comparing the lifetime expenditures
of two workers A and B whose only di￿erence is the industry in which they work. Suppose both
individuals work about 50 years always in the same industries and then are retired for 15 years
before dying, but individual A works in an industry in which skills are one standard deviation more
speci￿c than the industry where individual B works. As Table 5a shows, during the working years,
individual A has annual medical expenditure about $100 higher than individual B. Instead, when
retired, Table 9 shows that individual A has annual medical expenditure about $800 lower than
individual B. Thus, according to our estimates, during the working years individual A’s cumulative
health expenditure is on average $5000 higher than the health expenditure of individual B. During
the retirement years, individual A’s health expenditure is instead $12,000 lower than the individual
B’s. The total di￿erence is around $7000. Obviously, this is a very rough calculation that neglects
many important factors, such as switch across industries. Moreover, it comes from two cross
sectional datasets and not from a very long panel. In addition, on one side it neglects discounting,
but on the other side it also neglects that the price of medical care has been rising more than
the interest rate. Furthermore, it neglects any e￿ect of early health investment on mortality, and
on-the-job productivity (due both to sick-day productivity loss and earlier retirement due to poor
health). Nonetheless, we believe it describes in a very simple way the externality we have in mind
and its magnitude in the data.36
In addition, unreported quantile regressions show that the lower medical expenditure of retirees
that worked in high ASVP industries is achieved by reducing the upper tail of medical expenditures.
In particular, even a simple comparison of the distribution of medical expenditure of below- and
above-median ASVP show a much fatter right-tail for individuals that were working in high ASVP
industries. We believe this is a particularly interesting results, as it is well known that a small
fraction of people account for a very large fraction of total medical expenditure.
35The p-values of the coe￿cients of ASVP are .057 and .060, respectively.
36In fact, we believe that this is a serious underestimate of the real bene￿ts of early health investment.
267.2 Health Status of Retirees
We also investigate retirees’ health status. In MEPS we found that individuals with higher
medical expenditure have better self reported health. Our model suggests that in HRS individuals
with lower medical expenditure should have better self reported health status.
HRS reports a categorical indicator of self-reported health status, with 1 indicating \Excellent,",
2 for \Very Good", 3 for \Good", 4 for \Fair" and 5 for \Poor." Hence, we investigate how past-
industry ASVP is related to self-reported health using an ordered Probit regression. Table 10
reports the results. The coe￿cient of ASVP is negative and statistically signi￿cant, indicating that
retirees that worked in higher ASVP industries have better self-reported health, as predicted by
our model.
[Table 10 About Here]
8 Falsi￿cation Tests
In this Section, we present several falsi￿cation tests in order to show that the relationship
between health expenditure, health outcome and industry turnover rates we documented above
for the U.S. is related to its unique employment-based health insurance system. In particular,
countries with a national health system should not exhibit the same patterns that we documented
for the U.S.. To this end, we use data from the UK{a country that has a national health system
(supplemented by additional private health insurance){to perform several falsi￿cation tests.
In the ￿rst falsi￿cation test, we examine whether a similar relationship between medical expen-
diture and ASVP we documented in Tables 5a and 5b for U.S. workers holds for UK workers. Since
most individuals in the UK receive medical care from the National Health System, we should not
expect the medical expenditure of UK workers to have the same relationship with our proxy for job
attachment ASVP.37 We thus use the 1998 UK Family Expenditure Survey (UK FES) to examine
this issue.
Performing this falsi￿cation test using the UK FES is not ideal for a number of reasons. First,
UK FES and U.S. MEPS have di￿erent survey questionnaires that limit our ability to perform
a more thorough comparison. In particular, UK FES does not report an individual’s education,
which we have found to be an important predictor of medical expenditure. Instead, UK FES
37It is important to note that ASVP is calculated on U.S. data. Nonetheless, in unreported regression we ￿nd that
it is signi￿cant predictor of job tenure of UK workers, as we found for U.S. workers.
27reports a variable called \Social Class", which we take to be the closest substitute to education.
Moreover, other variables are coded di￿erently: for example the variable \Size of the ￿rm" is
a simple dichotomous variable that reports whether the employer has 25 or more workers. But
probably the more troubling issue is that UK FES reports only private medical expenditure and
not the medical care obtain through the National Health System. With all these caveats in mind,
nonetheless it is interesting to see that Table 11 shows that in UK, medical expenditure does not
have a statistically signi￿cant relationship with the corresponding industry ASVP.
[Table 11 About Here]
The previous caveats suggest that the comparison of medical expenditure between the U.S.
and the UK might be ￿awed. A more e￿ective way to compare medical care may be to compare
the quantity of services consumed by individuals. To this end, we perform a second falsi￿cation
replicating the analysis of doctor visits for U.S. individuals that we did in table 6 with UK data.
Again, we do not expect the number of doctor visits of UK workers to have the same relationship
with our proxy for job attachment ASVP. To perform the test we use the 1997 wave of British
Household Panel Survey (BHPS), a dataset that reports detailed informations on health-related
issues of a sample of UK individuals.38 Table 12 reports the results of negative binomial regressions
where the dependent variable is the number of annual doctor visits. As expected, table 12 shows that
in the UK there is no statistical di￿erence between individuals with high and low job attachment
ASVP in the frequency with which they visit a doctor, in contrast to the evidence for U.S..
[Table 12 About Here]
The third falsi￿cation test investigates the relationship between health status and industry
ASVP for UK workers. As in the previous falsi￿cation test, we should not expect health status of
UK workers to have the same relationship with our proxy for job attachment ASVP as in the U.S.,
since the UK has a National Health System and the mechanism of our model should not apply. We
use again the 1997 wave of BHPS to perform the test. As in MEPS, BHPS records individuals’
self-reported health status, classi￿ed in 5 categories, with 1 indicating \Excellent", 2 for \Good",
3 for \Fair", 4 for \Poor" and 5 for \Very Poor." Table 13 presents the results of our ordered
probit regression. The coe￿cient of ASVP is negative, but it is not statistically di￿erent from zero.
38We use the 1997 wave since it reports UKSIC92 industry codes, while most other waves use a di￿erent industry
classi￿cation system. UKSIC92 allows us to construct an easier crosswalk with US Census Industry Codes.
28This is in sharp contrast to what we found using U.S. data and provides additional evidence of the
relevance of the mechanism identi￿ed by our model.
[Table 13 About Here]
9 Alternative Hypotheses and Selection
In this Section, we discuss a number of alternative hypotheses. Most of these alternative
hypotheses consider some form of selection (based on di￿erent unobservables) that might drive
the observed correlations between job attachment on one side, and health plan o￿ers and medical
expenditure on the other side. However, we show that several features of the data are inconsistent
with the idea that these selection mechanisms are the main driving force of observed correlations.
Are \good" employers in high ASVP industries, and \bad" employers in low ASVP
industries? The ￿rst potential concern we address is that in principle the observed correlation
between job attachment and health plan o￿ers could simply be due to the fact that there are
some employers who o￿er all bene￿ts to their workers (good employers), and these employers are
in high ASVP industries. Thus, we use the MEPS IC to investigate whether the relationship we
found between an industry’s ASVP (proxy for exogenous turnover tendency) and the o￿ering of
health plan (Table 3), as well as the characteristics of health plans (Table 4) also shows up in other
components of a typical employee bene￿ts package.
MEPS IC asks whether employers o￿er bene￿ts such as paid vacations, sick leaves, life insurance,
disability insurance, pension plan, medical savings account, ￿exible spending account, and cafeteria
plans. Hence, we investigate whether job attachment{as proxied by ASVP{a￿ects employers’ o￿er
of these other bene￿ts. This is particularly important for our hypothesis that turnover rates are
related to health expenditures because of dynamic externalities. To ￿nd that other employee
bene￿ts that are presumably not subject to dynamic externalities are indeed unrelated to industry
ASVP will provide support for our hypothesis against alternative explanations.
Unfortunately, a number of these bene￿ts have many missing observations, and in some cases
(medical savings account, ￿exible spending account, and cafeteria plans) the missing observations
were too many for the estimates to be reliable. In Table 14, we report the coe￿cients of Probit
regressions that investigate whether job attachment, as proxied by ASVP, a￿ects employers’ o￿ering
of paid vacations, sick leaves, life insurance, disability insurance, and pension plans. All these
29regressions are corrected to take into account the sample selection criteria, i.e. we observe a ￿rm
in MEPS IC if the ￿rm o￿ers health insurance and has been sampled.
Table 14 shows that in most of the Probit regressions the industry ASVP does not have a
statistically signi￿cant e￿ect. Interestingly, bene￿ts that are less likely to be related to long-term
human capital (paid vacations and pension plan) have an insigni￿cant relationship with ASVP:
This is in contrast with our ￿ndings in Tables 3 and 4, where ASVP has an economically and
statistically signi￿cant relationship with employers’ health plan o￿ering and the characteristics of
health plans. Similarly, the bene￿t that is most similar to health insurance - disability insurance -
has instead a positive and signi￿cant coe￿cient, providing additional support for our hypotheses.
The coe￿cient on ASVP in the life insurance regression might seem a little bit at odds with our
explanation, as there is no obvious connection between life insurance and long term human capital.
However, probably o￿ering health insurance decreases the cost of o￿ering life insurance, and this
might easily rationalize the positive correlation between ASVP and life insurance o￿ering.39
[Table 14 About Here]
Is health more important in industries that have also higher job attachment? The
second potential concern we address is that in principle the observed correlation between job at-
tachment and health plan o￿ers and expenditures could simply be due to the fact that health is
more important in industries that have also higher job attachment. To address this issue, we again
turn to the DOT data, as their report, along with the SVP we previously used, a variable called
Strength de￿ned as follows: \The Physical Demands Strength Rating re￿ects the estimated overall
strength requirement of the job ... It represents the strength requirements which are considered to
be important for average, successful work performance."
Obviously, strength is not the same as health. But it is plausible that in occupations and
industries where strength is important, health is also particularly important, as a non-healthy
worker generally loses at least part of his strength. Thus, if the observed correlations between
job attachment and health expenditures were due to the fact that health is more important in
industries in which job attachment is high, then we should expect strength and job attachment to
be positively correlated.
However, it turns out that SVP and Strength are negatively correlated (￿ = ￿:225) at the
39Interestingly, Crocker and Moran (2003) ￿nd no relationship bewteen ASVP and life insurance o￿erig using the
NMES 1987.
30occupational level (the DOT data). They are even more negatively correlated at the industry level
(￿ = ￿:592), when we thus average occupations within each industry according to the occupation
and industry codes reported in the 5% sample form the Census. We thus conclude that is not
plausible that the observed correlations can be explained because health is more important in
industries that have higher job attachment.
Do high turnover industries have ￿atter wage pro￿les, thus attract more myopic due to
their higher initial wages? A third potential explanation has to do with di￿erent wage pro￿les
by industry. It might be that in high turnover industries wage pro￿les are ￿atter (higher wages
earlier, but with slower wage growth over time) and more myopic people go into these industries,
attracted by the higher initial wage. These people are likely to have a di￿erent intertemporal dis-
count, i.e. value today much more than tomorrow. This would explain why their health expenditure
is lower and employers o￿er them less health care.
However, this explanation is in sharp contrast with current theories of human capital, and
also with our simple model. General human capital steepens wage-tenure pro￿les because workers
must pay, in the form of lower wages, for any training that is general and thus transferable across
employers. Early in the career, workers receive investment in human capital and lower wages. When
human capital begins to increase productivity later in the career, workers have higher earnings.
Because general human capital is transferable, ￿rms must pay workers their full marginal product
in the post-investment period. Conversely, any type of speci￿c human capital ￿attens wage-tenure
pro￿les because the ￿rm makes a speci￿c investment, but recoups its investment later once the
workers are locked in. Indeed, this is exactly what our model predicts.
High turnover industries have lower scores of ASVP, thus speci￿c human capital is less important
and general human capital is more important in such industries. As a result, theoretically we should
have expected high turnover industries to have steeper, not ￿atter (as needed for this alternative
explanation), wage pro￿les.
Empirically, Crocker and Moran (2003) exactly con￿rm these predictions of human capital
theories. In their wage regression (see Table 2 of their paper) they ￿nd that the coe￿cient ASVP is
positive, the coe￿cient on the interaction between ASVP and \Job Tenure" is negative, while the
coe￿cient on the interaction between ASVP and \Years of Education" is positive, after controlling
for a number of worker demographics and ￿rm characteristics, indicating that returns to tenure
is higher in lower ASVP (thus high turnover) industries. We thus conclude that workers’ myopia
31cannot explain our ￿ndings.
Could it be a pure wealth e￿ect? A forth potential alternative explanation is a pure wealth
e￿ect. If wages are higher in low turnover industries, then a simple wealth e￿ect might explain why
health expenditure is higher in low turnover industries. Indeed, in a recent paper Hall and Jones
(2006) argue that the growth of health spending in the past half century is a rational response to
the growth of income per person. According to their model, health spending is a superior good
with an income elasticity well above one.
Clearly, our explanation and Hall and Jones’ are not mutually exclusive. Hall and Jones focus
on the growth of expenditure in the last 20 years, while we focus on the intertemporal pro￿le
of expenditure. However, we believe that the wealth e￿ect cannot fully explain a number of our
cross-sectional results. First, all our regressions on MEPS data include individuals’ current income
and the best proxy for permanent income, i.e. education. Moreover, in the regressions using HRS
data we ￿nd exactly the opposite: in Table 9, the coe￿cient of the (log of) total asset is negative,
suggesting that wealthier retired individuals spend less in health.
In summary, we believe that the wealth e￿ect cannot explain the intertemporal patterns in
health expenditure that we document in our analysis.
What about job lock and commitment? As we brie￿y mentioned in the introduction, there is
a large established literature showing that employment-based health insurance provides ine￿ciently
low separation between mismatched workers and ￿rms. To take this job lock hypothesis to a
dynamic setting, we would expect to see that industries with high ASVP, because they are more
likely to o￿er health insurance (as we show in Table 3) and more likely to o￿er better health
insurance contracts (as we show in Table 4) should be more attractive to workers with worse
health: after all, healthy workers bene￿t less from generous health insurance. In a steady state,
then job lock dynamics should lead to a negative relationship between workers’ health and ASVP.
Instead, Table 8 showed us that the opposite is true. The coe￿cient of ASVP is negative and
statistically signi￿cant, indicating that workers in higher ASVP industries have better self-reported
health. This shows that job lock can not be the only mechanism at work to explain our previously
documented relationship between industry ASVP and medical expenditure (in Table 5a and 5b).
Moreover, a similar argument reveals the negative relationship between ASVP and health status
is also inconsistent with a steady state extension of the model in Crocker and Moran (2003). They
argue that impediments to worker mobility such as speci￿c skills serve to mitigate the attrition of
32all individuals from employer sponsored insurance pool. Nonetheless, in their model the healthier
workers are still more likely to switch job. Thus, even starting with an identical pool, we should
expect over time low turnover industries to be populated by less healthy individuals.
10 Conclusion
In this paper we investigated how the employment-based health insurance system in the U.S.
a￿ects individuals’ life-cycle health-care decisions. We take the viewpoint that health is a form of
human capital that a￿ects workers’ productivities on the job, and derive implications of employees’
turnover on the incentives to undertake health investment. Our model suggests that employee
turnovers lead to dynamic ine￿ciencies in health investment, and particularly, it suggests that
employment-based health insurance system in the U.S. might lead to an ine￿cient low level of
individual health during individuals’ working ages. Moreover, we show that under-investment in
health is positively related to the turnover rate of the workers’ industry and increases medical
expenditure in retirement.
We present a model that makes this process explicit and then investigate its empirical relevance
using data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey and the Health and Retirement Survey.
We document a large number of empirical patterns all consistent with our hypotheses. Moreover,
the magnitude of our estimates suggests signi￿cant degree of intertemporal ine￿ciencies in health
investment in the U.S. as a result of the employment-based health insurance system. A very
rough back of the envelope calculation suggests that on average every additional dollar of health
expenditure during working years may lead to about 2.5 dollars of savings in retirement. While
such calculations are necessarily rough, it does suggest potential channels to help solve the crisis of
ever-rising health care costs in the U.S.
Finally, the results in this paper provide a strong link between the institutional features of the
U.S. health care market, the incentives to invest in health it generates, and health outcomes. We
believe that the interaction between private and public provision of medical care in the U.S. might
be particularly subject to the dynamic externality we consider. Indeed, a striking manifestation of
the intertemporal interactions between private employment-based health insurance system and the
public Medicare is shown in Figure 1, taken from Hagist and Kotliko￿ (2005). Figure 1 graphs the
ratio of the per capita health expenditures of di￿erent age groups relative to that of the 50-64 age
group for 10 OECD countries, including the U.S. While the per capita health care expenditure is
33higher for the 65-69 age group than for the 50-64 age group, that ratio is much higher in the U.S.
(5.1) than all the other nine OECD countries (where Canada has the second highest ratio at 2.45).
Speci￿cally, the timing of the interaction between private health insurance and Medicare implies
that health investment not made prior to age 65 generates health costs that increase Medicare’s
expenditures. Moreover, it seems plausible to suspect that Medicare availability at age 65 leads
individuals to delay more costly health expenditure after they turn 65.40 We believe these are ￿rst
order policy issues and we hope that our paper spurs further research on these important topics.
[Figure 1 About Here]
A Proof of Proposition 1:
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To show (ii), from equation (5), the amount w￿
1 ￿ (f (h1) ￿ pm￿
1) is equal to:
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40Card, Dobkin and Maestas (2005) document a discrete increase in the use of health care corresponding to the
onset of Medicare eligibility at age 65.
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which concludes the Proof.
B Speci￿c Vocational Preparation (SVP)
This appendix provides some background information from DOL about the variable \Speci￿c
Vocational Preparation" in the DOT data:
\Speci￿c Vocational Preparation is de￿ned as the amount of lapsed time required by a typical
worker to learn the techniques, acquire the information, and develop the facility needed for average
performance in a speci￿c job-worker situation. This training may be acquired in a school, work,
military, institutional, or vocational environment. It does not include the orientation time required
of a fully quali￿ed worker to become accustomed to the special conditions of any new job. Speci￿c
vocational training includes: vocational education, apprenticeship training, in-plant training, on-
the-job training, and essential experience in other jobs. Speci￿c vocational training includes training
given in any of the following circumstances: (a). Vocational education (high school; commercial
or shop training; technical school; art school; and that part of college training which is organized
around a speci￿c vocational objective); (b). Apprenticeship training (for apprenticeable jobs only);
(c). In-plant training (organized classroom study provided by an employer); (d). On-the-job
training (serving as learner or trainee on the job under the instruction of a quali￿ed worker); (e).
Essential experience in other jobs (serving in less responsible jobs which lead to the higher grade
job or serving in other jobs which qualify).
The following is an explanation of the various levels of speci￿c vocational preparation (Note:
The levels of this scale are mutually exclusive and do not overlap):
35Time Requirement Numerical Value
Short demonstration only 1
Anything beyond short demonstration up to and including 1 month 2
Over 1 month up to and including 3 months 3
Over 3 months up to and including 6 months 4
Over 6 months up to and including 1 year 5
Over 1 year up to and including 2 years 6
Over 2 years up to and including 4 years 7
Over 4 years up to and including 10 years 8
Over 10 years 9
C An Alternative Empirical Strategy
To check the robustness of our results, in this appendix we present results from an alternative
instrumental variable empirical strategy to deal with the endogeneity problem (or reverse causality)
between worker turnover and health insurance o￿ering (as employees might be more likely to leave
jobs that do not o￿er health insurance).
To correct for this reverse causality concern, we employ instruments that shifts the job tenure
of the individual independently of the health insurance contract o￿ered to him. More speci￿cally,
we use as an instrument for the current job tenure of individual i of age a working in the 3-digit
industry j the average tenure of the individuals of age a in the same 3-digit industry j in the UK,
calculated from the 1997 UK Labour Force Survey. The idea is that reverse causality is not a
concern in the UK, since there is a National Health System. Thus, average industry turnover in
the UK precisely captures only the average job attachment in each industry.
[Table 15 About Here]
We do not report the results for all regressions, for sake of space we only report in Table 15
the results of the most important regressions of our analysis. Column (1) reports whether health
insurance is o￿ered, and Column (2) reports the fraction of the premium paid by the employer.
Table 15 shows that jobs with longer tenures are associated with more coverage and employers pay
a higher fraction of the health plan premium, as our model predicts.
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40Variable Mean Std. Dev.
ASVP 5.1909 0.8315
Age 33.3507 22.5347
Years of Education 8.9978 6.8170
Male 0.5160 0.4997
Income 16,694.700 23,717.210
Size of Family 3.5613 1.8267
Union Membership 0.0532 0.2244
Less than 99 Employees 0.2623 0.4399
Between 100 and 199 Employees 0.0241 0.1535
Between 200 and 299 Employees 0.0371 0.1891
Between 300 and 399 Employees 0.0126 0.1117
Between 400 and 499 Employees 0.0043 0.0653
More than 500 Employees 0.0644 0.2455
Health Insurance Offered 0.6401 0.4800
Total Medical Charges 3,066.272 13,113.020
Total Medical Expenditure 2,025.265 7,002.384
ASVP 5.234 0.819
Age 73.390 5.440
Years of Education 12.060 3.306
Male 0.410 0.490
Total Assets 333,571.000 890,713.000
Size of Family 1.996 0.928
Total Medical Expenditure 8,903.093 24,995.410
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for MEPS 1998 and HRS 2002
Panel B: HRS 2002
Notes: Total Assets and Total Medical Expenditure have been deflated to 
correspond to 1998 dollars. Number of Observations vary by variable.











p-value of difference 0.0391 0.0631
Table 2: Medical Expenditures of Clerical Workers in Two 
Industries During Working and Retirement:  An Illustration
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Clerical workers are 1990
Census occupation codes 303 to 389. Professional services are
1990 Census industry codes 812 to 893. Manufacturing are 1990



















Less than 99 Employees -0.01718
(0.08362)
Between 100 and 199 Employees 0.79621
(0.09983)***
Between 200 and 299 Employees 0.69355
(0.09081)***
Between 300 and 399 Employees 0.72526
(0.10892)***
Between 400 and 499 Employees 0.96619
(0.22075)***




Number of Observations 9297
Log-Likelihood -4683.7197
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the industry level in brackets. *, **, and *** respectively
denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%. Coefficients for Race, Census region and MSA resident
dummies not shown. The omitted category for the firm size is "Number of employees missing."










Probit Ordered Tobit Tobit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ASVP -0.14129 -0.10249 0.02629 -15.39527
(0.04103)*** (0.04095)** (0.01128)** (14.85113)
Age 0.02510 -0.04030 0.00326 2.57347
(0.02188) (0.02897) (0.00487) (3.99571)
Age Squared -0.00071 0.00082 -0.00005 -0.07080
(0.00046) (0.00062) (0.00010) (0.08129)
Age Cubed 0.00001 -0.00001 0.00000 0.00062
(0.00000)* (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00053)
Years of Education -0.02335 -0.01659 0.00247 -0.27678
(0.01032)** (0.01108) (0.00163) (1.58152)
Male 0.02297 0.01331 -0.00819 9.90805
(0.03933) (0.04966) (0.00776) (7.05445)
Income/10,000 -0.00445 -0.00613 0.00055 1.21198
(0.00909) (0.01241) (0.00121) (1.15559)
Size of Family -0.00420 -0.04881 0.00240 0.54174
(0.01763) (0.01860)*** (0.00235) (2.32306)
Union Membership -0.18349 -0.15894 0.02678 -11.69372
(0.06971)*** (0.08401)* (0.01428)* (10.73299)
Less than 99 Employees 0.27343 0.57315 0.00109 -129.45443
(0.07043)*** (0.08576)*** (0.01739) (6.12141)***
Between 100 and 199 Employees 0.25128 0.43993 0.02656 -133.48621
(0.07164)*** (0.09620)*** (0.02153) (10.98681)***
Between 200 and 299 Employees 0.37674 0.37992 0.00787 -141.84885
(0.11212)*** (0.11204)*** (0.03818) (16.38131)***
Between 300 and 399 Employees 0.16274 0.23170 0.03073 -179.84318
(0.13161) (0.18527) (0.03412) (23.62398)***
Between 400 and 499 Employees 0.30957 0.40486 0.02887 -157.18063
(0.11171)*** (0.11325)*** (0.03555) (26.67827)***
More than 500 Employees 0.16671 0.02320 0.06585 -407.56992
(0.19320) (0.23780) (0.04364) (22.25667)***
Constant 0.54458 0.51811 117.62787
(0.42228) (0.10167)*** (93.42151)
Observations 11563 2327 9674 12613
Log-Likelihood -7517.2710 -3930.2832 3685.0676 -80952.0828
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the industry level in brackets. *, **, and *** respectively denote
significance at 10%, 5% and 1%. The insurance contracts used in this analysis are single coverage
contracts. Coefficients for Race, Census region and MSA resident dummies not shown. The omitted
category for the firm size is "Number of employees missing." The ancillary cutoff parameter estimates are
not reported for the ordered Probit regression. 















(1) (2) (3) (4)
ASVP 402.86234 199.83139 334.05588 188.73237
(163.72470)** (92.18805)** (157.23528)** (76.19198)**
Age -271.79518 -135.48200 -240.28805 -147.79864
(151.40625)* (72.54693)* (164.05060) (81.49398)*
Age Squared 7.24145 3.78860 5.92131 3.97654
(3.49528)** (1.67349)** (3.91441) (1.97240)**
Age Cubed -0.03754 -0.01831 -0.02772 -0.02027
(0.02427) (0.01175) (0.02832) (0.01448)
Years of Education 105.68769 74.50786 34.63838 50.19430
(65.44683) (27.85408)*** (40.41011) (23.37723)**
Male -2,236.79216 -1,257.70676 -1,561.66237 -1,020.45045
(320.75747)*** (148.41494)*** (214.90330)*** (127.40069)***
Income/10,000 -75.63153 -38.30580 -53.93869 -51.06326
(51.76807) (21.39773)* (44.61004) (22.28929)**
Size of Family -448.88454 -239.44413 -290.47720 -177.02758
(96.53232)*** (36.88887)*** (82.55606)*** (39.43289)***
Union Membership 867.95029 511.95508 302.65145 278.60094
(360.75249)** (178.63679)*** (285.20660) (163.75836)*
Less than 99 Employees -902.96722 -688.08760 -272.36730 -342.55725
(310.32398)*** (155.57165)*** (299.51692) (166.99841)**
Between 100 and 199 Employees -680.74278 -536.71890 -216.35632 -397.54820
(476.78389) (231.39089)** (452.33145) (254.29040)
Between 200 and 299 Employees -301.19075 -168.39342 -17.50772 -116.45070
(501.10916) (283.66786) (495.29392) (305.15153)
Between 300 and 399 Employees -579.53327 -355.67272 -436.40978 -300.46188
(485.22562) (256.45317) (411.47193) (260.58614)
Between 400 and 499 Employees -171.24158 5.22617 190.34569 115.13357
(682.72355) (490.41116) (697.06543) (526.40492)
More than 500 Employees -443.15328 -237.74508 -82.04443 -112.12249
(344.95752) (194.90131) (329.28907) (214.80182)
Constant 11,495.29641 6,152.90327 5,955.50903 4,628.64135
(4,514.72536)** (2,149.86559)*** (4,177.97321) (3,130.27433)
Observations 13459 13459 9828 9828
Log-Likelihood -116965.85 -111399.90 -88697.89 -84918.46
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the industry level in brackets. *, **, and *** respectively denote
significance at 10%, 5% and 1%. The insurance contracts used in this analysis are single coverage
contracts. Coefficients for Race, Census region and MSA resident dummies not shown. The omitted
category for the firm size is "Number of employees missing." 
Table 5a: Medical Expenditures and Charges: Tobit Regression in LevelsLog of Total 
Charges
Log of Total 
Expenditures
Log of Total 
Charges
Log of Total 
Expenditures







(1) (2) (3) (4)
ASVP 0.21412 0.21522 0.19165 0.16800
(0.06722)*** (0.06273)*** (0.04375)*** (0.03703)***
Age -0.23511 -0.23645 -0.22596 -0.22798
(0.05341)*** (0.05283)*** (0.04525)*** (0.04325)***
Age Squared 0.00567 0.00604 0.00542 0.00577
(0.00111)*** (0.00111)*** (0.00099)*** (0.00095)***
Age Cubed -0.00003 -0.00004 -0.00003 -0.00004
(0.00001)*** (0.00001)*** (0.00001)*** (0.00001)***
Years of Education 0.14029 0.13214 0.10636 0.10023
(0.02219)*** (0.01997)*** (0.01357)*** (0.01278)***
Male -1.68989 -1.62577 -1.40969 -1.36234
(0.11797)*** (0.11278)*** (0.06842)*** (0.06182)***
Income/10,000 0.04295 0.03977 0.02772 0.01927
(0.01299)*** (0.01231)*** (0.01247)** (0.01172)
Size of Family -0.19642 -0.19084 -0.16839 -0.16956
(0.02427)*** (0.02278)*** (0.02684)*** (0.02511)***
Union Membership 0.44034 0.42629 0.22718 0.21320
(0.11650)*** (0.10581)*** (0.11390)** (0.09943)**
Less than 99 Employees -0.17489 -0.13629 -0.03276 0.03817
(0.07816)** (0.07241)* (0.08174) (0.07322)
Between 100 and 199 Employees 0.16299 0.20360 0.11096 0.11207
(0.16909) (0.14554) (0.15460) (0.13570)
Between 200 and 299 Employees 0.15217 0.20165 -0.02015 0.03480
(0.15256) (0.14361) (0.14673) (0.13744)
Between 300 and 399 Employees 0.31465 0.37519 0.12603 0.24860
(0.21303) (0.17740)** (0.17180) (0.14736)*
Between 400 and 499 Employees 0.47266 0.49288 0.37047 0.37664
(0.33446) (0.31746) (0.33088) (0.32386)
More than 500 Employees 0.26114 0.33936 0.14525 0.22057
(0.11397)** (0.10326)*** (0.11113) (0.10193)**
Constant 3.29260 3.41453 3.64367 4.02803
(0.74005)*** (0.72993)*** (0.85175)*** (0.78619)***
Observations 13459 13459 9828 9828
Log-Likelihood -31585.46 -31164.45 -23042.71 -22629.08
Table 5b: Log of Medical Expenditures and Charges: Tobit Regression in Logs
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the industry level in brackets. *, **, and *** respectively denote significance
at 10%, 5% and 1%. The insurance contracts used in this analysis are single coverage contracts. Coefficients
for Race, Census region and MSA resident dummies not shown. The omitted category for the firm size is








(1) (2) (3) (4)
ASVP 0.04638 0.05119 0.05297 0.05797
(0.02678)* (0.02511)** (0.02162)** (0.02043)**
Age -0.00507 -0.01882 -0.02824 -0.03120
(0.02258) (0.02120) (0.01586)* (0.01781)*
Age Squared 0.00076 0.00089 0.00120 0.00111
(0.00047) (0.00045)** (0.00034)*** (0.00038)***
Age Cubed -6.64e-06 -6.56e-06 -8.63e-06 -7.17e-06
(3.02e-06)** (2.99e-06)** (2.22e-06)*** (2.59e-06)***
Years of Education 0.03922 0.03573 0.02593 0.01773
(0.00841)*** (0.00821)*** (0.00930)*** (0.00789)***
Male -0.59335 -0.61817 -0.62162 -0.60956
(0.04334)*** (0.03797)*** (0.03775)*** (0.03302)***
Income -0.01120 -0.00475 -0.01925 -0.01452
(0.00812) (0.00795) (0.00599)*** (0.00597)***
Size of Family -0.070539 -0.05069 -0.04282 -0.02767
(0.01953)*** (0.01583)*** (0.01627)*** (0.01439)***
Union Membership 0.24440 0.23933 0.23146 0.21155
(0.07734)*** (0.08180)*** (0.05331)*** (0.05747)***
Less than 99 Employees -0.29328 -0.19278 -0.24752 -0.15143
(0.055815)*** (0.06006)*** (0.03914)*** (0.04324)***
Between 100 and 199 Employees -0.36110 -0.30220 -0.22653 -0.17195
(0.07687)*** (0.07834)*** (0.05860)*** (0.06325)***
Between 200 and 299 Employees -0.31207 -0.27535 -0.17751 -0.13081
(0.09045)*** (0.09450)*** (0.08319)** (0.08699)**
Between 300 and 399 Employees -0.27448 -0.22585 -0.16847 -0.10973
(0.10347)*** (0.09899)** (0.07398)** (0.07185)**
Between 400 and 499 Employees 0.17926 0.22589 0.15404 0.19189
(0.16068) (0.16638) (0.14082) (0.14579)
More than 500 Employees -0.19461 -0.16121 -0.15222 -0.07422
(0.09043)** (0.08652)* (0.06180)** (0.06725)**
Census Region andn MSA Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Race Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 13459 9828 13459 9828
Log-Likelihood -32451.928 -24677.91 -28649.66 -21705.396
Visits to Physicians
Table 6: Workers in High ASVP Industries have more frequent visits to the doctor
Negative Binomial Regression Results. Dependent Variable is "Number of Office Based Visits" and            
"Number of Visits to Physicians"
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the industry level in brackets. *, **, and *** respectively denote significance
at 10%, 5% and 1%. Coefficients for included dummies are not shown. The omitted category for the firm size is
"Number of employees missing." 











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ASVP -0.08494 -0.08474 -0.12781 -0.06516 -0.05747 -0.06216 -0.11267 -0.05740
(0.01744)*** (0.03269)*** (0.02439)*** (0.03292)** (0.01984)*** (0.03660)* (0.02641)*** (0.03305)*
Age -0.10428 -0.21967 0.12584 -0.09311 -0.14554 -0.33603 0.01438 -0.11411
(0.01913)*** (0.12083)* (0.07391)* (0.06216) (0.02214)*** (0.13629)** (0.09681) (0.07364)
Age Squared 0.00195 0.00232 -0.00264 0.00039 0.00268 0.00418 -0.00070 0.00075
(0.00040)*** (0.00202) (0.00131)** (0.00110) (0.00046)*** (0.00230)* (0.00171) (0.00132)
Age Cubed -0.00001 -0.00001 0.00002 0.00000 -0.00001 -0.00002 0.00001 0.00000
(0.00000)*** (0.00001) (0.00001)** (0.00001) (0.00000)*** (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001)
Years of Education -0.02726 -0.03947 -0.03950 -0.04934 -0.03055 -0.03130 -0.03240 -0.04405
(0.00612)*** (0.00894)*** (0.00874)*** (0.00835)*** (0.00830)*** (0.01149)*** (0.00993)*** (0.00943)***
Income/10,000 -0.02793 -0.02544 -0.02151 -0.01285 -0.02068 -0.01913 -0.01519 -0.00758
(0.00842)*** (0.00980)*** (0.00993)** (0.00638)** (0.00865)** (0.01007)* (0.00845)* (0.00664)
Size of Family 0.02515 0.00063 0.01203 -0.00595 0.03140 0.00653 0.00964 -0.01487
(0.01054)** (0.01573) (0.01452) (0.01013) (0.01329)** (0.02093) (0.01844) (0.01280)
Union Membership -0.08576 -0.06107 -0.14461 -0.10510 -0.04007 -0.00520 -0.11955 -0.05548
(0.04868)* (0.05666) (0.05636)** (0.05327)** (0.05261) (0.05855) (0.05880)** (0.05305)
Less than 99 Employees -0.04083 0.01039 -0.00001 0.13686 -0.02558 0.06854 0.05473 0.10495
(0.03280) (0.04778) (0.04827) (0.04216)*** (0.04950) (0.06716) (0.07267) (0.05769)*
Between 100 and 199 Employees -0.15298 -0.17367 -0.16623 -0.00415 -0.13648 0.04007 -0.01272 0.02964
(0.09916) (0.12013) (0.10164) (0.09804) (0.11074) (0.12237) (0.10995) (0.10701)
Between 200 and 299 Employees -0.06131 -0.11425 -0.04161 -0.01812 0.00275 0.03357 0.12095 0.02876
(0.06871) (0.09416) (0.08531) (0.06650) (0.08594) (0.12038) (0.12584) (0.07950)
Between 300 and 399 Employees 0.09028 -0.00436 0.21538 -0.04928 0.18586 0.13892 0.39117 0.02332
(0.08811) (0.14820) (0.11844)* (0.13587) (0.08361)** (0.14986) (0.11680)*** (0.14763)
Between 400 and 499 Employees -0.10732 0.16172 0.17034 0.01634 -0.01236 0.37090 0.37183 0.06790
(0.15031) (0.22191) (0.19371) (0.12846) (0.16284) (0.24383) (0.21996)* (0.13083)
More than 500 Employees -0.08219 -0.11263 -0.05739 -0.10180 -0.04800 0.00630 0.04416 -0.05964
(0.04860)* (0.07367) (0.06165) (0.06707) (0.06270) (0.08840) (0.08432) (0.07909)
Ancillary Parameters:
Between 1 and 2 years -2.38367 -7.38447 0.74591 -4.05689 -3.06164 -9.51533 -1.40171 -4.54037
(0.30378)*** (2.39540)*** (1.33276) (1.16021)*** (0.32629)*** (2.69865)*** (1.74548) (1.35057)***
Between 2 and 5 years -1.87629 -6.90608 1.25689 -3.63906 -2.53821 -9.00412 -0.84266 -4.09130
(0.30653)*** (2.39998)*** (1.33493) (1.15848)*** (0.33018)*** (2.70442)*** (1.74739) (1.34963)***
More than 5 years, but not never -1.53871 -6.64861 1.57564 -3.37982 -2.18997 -8.72787 -0.47762 -3.80078
(0.30807)*** (2.40258)*** (1.33410) (1.15808)*** (0.32917)*** (2.70508)*** (1.74707) (1.35016)***
Never -1.03525 -6.40158 2.07900 -3.13856 -1.70657 -8.49245 0.01943 -3.56156
(0.31278)*** (2.40323)*** (1.33954) (1.15987)*** (0.33527)*** (2.70388)*** (1.74697) (1.35035)***
Observations 6301 3279 4079 6336 4637 2522 3142 4918
Log-Likelihood -6981.7798 -3990.5204 -4132.4245 -7252.2133 -4712.6727 -2883.4563 -2831.2117 -5549.7398
Table 7a: Consumption of Preventive Care: Ordered Probit Regression Result
Estimation samples also vary because of age restrictions. For pap smear, women older than 18 are included. For mammogram, women older than 40. For 
breast exam, women older than 35. For cholesterol check, men older than 35 and women older than 45.
Panel A: All Individuals Panel B: Individuals Who Received Insurance from Their Jobs
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the industry level in brackets.  *, **, and *** respectively denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%. The insurance contracts 
used in this analysis are single coverage contracts. Coefficients for Race, Census region and MSA resident dummies not shown. The omitted category for the 









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ASVP 0.07990 0.09709 0.13444 0.07731 0.04714 0.06078 0.10513 0.06266
(0.02131)*** (0.03719)*** (0.02921)*** (0.03373)** (0.02833)* (0.04413) (0.03243)*** (0.03329)*
Age 0.08199 0.12967 -0.10198 0.06507 0.13412 0.31242 0.02786 0.06245
(0.02309)*** (0.16642) (0.09440) (0.07245) (0.02562)*** (0.18820)* (0.13056) (0.08783)
Age Squared -0.00164 -0.00106 0.00214 0.00011 -0.00253 -0.00405 -0.00006 0.00014
(0.00049)*** (0.00279) (0.00165) (0.00128) (0.00056)*** (0.00319) (0.00228) (0.00157)
Age Cubed 0.00001 0.00000 -0.00001 -0.00000 0.00001 0.00002 -0.00000 -0.00000
(0.00000)*** (0.00002) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00000)*** (0.00002) (0.00001) (0.00001)
Years of Education 0.03140 0.03366 0.04148 0.05107 0.03925 0.03144 0.03826 0.04469
(0.00723)*** (0.00949)*** (0.00956)*** (0.00883)*** (0.01058)*** (0.01468)** (0.01471)*** (0.00997)***
Income/10,000 0.03419 0.02168 0.01805 0.01091 0.02281 0.01101 0.01420 0.00611
(0.01098)*** (0.01137)* (0.01266) (0.00819) (0.00939)** (0.01201) (0.01043) (0.00790)
Size of Family -0.01815 0.00410 -0.00427 0.00877 -0.01856 0.00026 0.01385 0.01809
(0.01326) (0.01706) (0.01672) (0.01123) (0.01657) (0.02286) (0.02143) (0.01396)
Union Membership 0.07271 0.09780 0.13680 0.09838 0.01677 0.03799 0.11110 0.03654
(0.08225) (0.09647) (0.10010) (0.06372) (0.09464) (0.09421) (0.11757) (0.06441)
Less than 99 Employees 0.00317 0.00112 0.00270 -0.11425 -0.01895 -0.08110 -0.07778 -0.08688
(0.03789) (0.05580) (0.05232) (0.04653)** (0.05961) (0.07728) (0.09044) (0.07148)
Between 100 and 199 Employees 0.11757 0.26619 0.32454 0.06093 0.07150 0.01471 0.10019 0.00260
(0.10641) (0.13801)* (0.11911)*** (0.11820) (0.10965) (0.14227) (0.12688) (0.12982)
Between 200 and 299 Employees 0.02429 0.12864 0.10487 0.06673 -0.05615 -0.07273 -0.10076 0.01062
(0.08577) (0.13089) (0.12603) (0.07917) (0.10172) (0.16086) (0.16724) (0.09306)
Between 300 and 399 Employees -0.11910 0.13516 -0.10377 0.02960 -0.22652 -0.00761 -0.27858 -0.04557
(0.13478) (0.17783) (0.16382) (0.14692) (0.13392)* (0.19048) (0.17494) (0.16188)
Between 400 and 499 Employees 0.12352 -0.31786 -0.10725 0.24030 0.04500 -0.51448 -0.29221 0.10520
(0.20253) (0.27725) (0.24256) (0.15850) (0.22243) (0.30749)* (0.28560) (0.16580)
More than 500 Employees 0.18978 0.21939 0.26513 0.17060 0.14546 0.04646 0.14987 0.10160
(0.06486)*** (0.08312)*** (0.09226)*** (0.06735)** (0.08369)* (0.11233) (0.12329) (0.08206)
Constant -1.72677 -5.07163 0.68240 -3.28449 -2.53218 -8.42762 -1.78865 -3.18759
(0.35076)*** (3.26613) (1.73883) (1.36371)** (0.36515)*** (3.67126)** (2.42888) (1.64153)*
Observations 6300 3279 4079 6335 4636 2522 3142 4917
Log-Likelihood -3040.9760 -1825.2546 -1779.4284 -3362.9079 -1997.3605 -1287.9160 -1161.6997 -2542.1149
Table 7b: Consumption of Preventive Care: Did You Receive the Following Care in the Last Two Years?
Estimation samples also vary because of age restrictions. For pap smear, women older than 18 are included. For mammogram, women older than 40. For
breast exam, women older than 35. For cholesterol check, men older than 35 and women older than 45.
Panel A: All Individuals
Panel B: Individuals Who Received Insurance from Their 
Jobs
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the industry level in brackets. *, **, and *** respectively denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%. The insurance contracts
used in this analysis are single coverage contracts. Coefficients for Race, Census region and MSA resident dummies not shown. The omitted category for the
firm size is "Number of employees missing." (1) (2) (3)
ASVP -0.03271 -0.03755 -0.03175
(0.01302)** (0.01612)** (0.01344)**
Age 0.07939 0.08209 0.08154
(0.01338)*** (0.01321)*** (0.01343)***
Age Squared -0.00107 -0.00111 -0.0011
(0.00030)*** (0.00029)*** (0.00030)***
Years of Education -0.05837 -0.05862 -0.05831
(0.00504)*** (0.00510)*** (0.00518)***
Male -0.08505 -0.05913 -0.06733
(0.02176)*** (0.02594)** (0.02456)***
Income -0.03895 -0.03552 -0.03604
(0.00531)*** (0.00506)*** (0.00507)***
Size of Family -0.03687 -0.03579 -0.03595
(0.00580)*** (0.00594)*** (0.00591)***
Union Membership 0.07077 0.06605 0.07146
(0.03494)** (0.03666)* (0.03551)**
Less than 99 Employees -0.29144 -0.14999 -0.15255
(0.02739)*** (0.05644)*** (0.05560)***
Between 100 and 199 Employees -0.31575 -0.17416 -0.18303
(0.04830)*** (0.06304)*** (0.06244)***
Between 200 and 299 Employees -0.28835 -0.14779 -0.15429
(0.04357)*** (0.06042)** (0.05988)***
Between 300 and 399 Employees -0.20223 -0.06001 -0.07177
(0.06125)*** -0.07542 -0.07482
Between 400 and 499 Employees -0.28727 -0.14517 -0.1549
(0.11655)** -0.13342 -0.13324
More than 500 Employees -0.29125 -0.14939 -0.15962
(0.03596)*** (0.05901)** (0.05897)***
Census Region andn MSA Dummy Yes Yes Yes
Race Dummy Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummy No Yes No
Occupation Dummy No Yes Yes
Observations 13210 13210 13210
Log-Likelihood -17649.9684 -17628.3978 -17636.1593
Table 8: Workers in High ASVP Industries are Healthier
Ordered Probit Regression Results: Dependent Variable is "Perceived Health Status 1: 
Excellent; 2: Very Good; 3: Good; 4: Fair; 5 Poor"
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the industry level in brackets. *, **, and ***
respectively denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%. Coefficients for included dummies










Age Squared -303.24658 -268.25879
(312.59471) (307.41429)
Age Cubed 1.36288 1.21570
(0.00000) (1.34007)
Years of Education 132.20731 132.08439
(125.75570) (125.91594)
Total Assets / 100000 -56.60577 -56.22011
(21.63801)*** (21.74032)***








Table 9: Retirees' Medical Expenditures: Results from HRS
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** respectively denote
significance at 10%, 5% and 1%. Standard errors clustered at the industry level in










Age Squared -0.00141 -0.00050
(0.00652) (0.00660)
Age Cubed 0.00001 0.00000
(0.00003) (0.00003)
Years of Education -0.06952 -0.06938
(0.00554)*** (0.00560)***
Total Assets / 100000 -0.01329 -0.01339
(0.00364)*** (0.00368)***






Notes: Robust standard errors in parantheses. Standard errors clustered
at the industry level in brackets. *, **, and *** respectively denote
significance at 10%, 5% and 1%. Coefficients for Race Census region
and MSA resident dummies are not shown.
Table 10: Retirees Who Used to Work in High ASVP Industries are 
Healthier in HRS
Ordered Probit Regression Results: Independent Variable is "Perceived 
Health Status 1: Excellent; 2: Very Good; 3: Good; 4: Fair; 5 Poor"(1) (2)
Variables Medical Expenditure










Size of Family 0.19965 0.02238
(0.08023)** (0.00717)***
Less than 24 Employees -1.15973 -0.15392
(0.74773) (0.07000)**






Table 11: Falsification Result from the Medical Expenditure in the 
UK Family Expenditure Survey (1998)
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the industry level in brackets.
Coefficients for Income Brackets, social status, marital status and
Geographic region dummies are not shown. *, **, *** respectively






















Table 12: UK Workers in High ASVP Industries do not visit more 
frequently the doctor
Negative Binomial Regression Results: Dependent Variable is 
"Number of Annual Doctor Visits"
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the industry level in brackets. *, **,
and *** respectively denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%.




















Table 13: UK Workers in High ASVP Industries are not Healthier
Ordered Probit Regression Results: dependent Variable is "Perceived Health 
Status 1: Excellent; 2: Good; 3: Fair; 4 Poor; 5 Very Poor"
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the industry level in brackets. *, **, and
*** respectively denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%. Coefficients for
included dummies are not shown.  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables Life Insurance Pension Plan Sick Leave Disability Vacation
ASVP 0.35213 -0.06336 0.21182 0.41561 0.14193
(0.13250)*** (0.15360) (0.17455) (0.18731)** (0.16749)
Age -0.08706 -0.17460 -0.24775 0.00769 -0.20727
(0.08399) (0.08103)** (0.08567)*** (0.09384) (0.15502)
Age Squared 0.00274 0.00298 0.00430 0.00122 0.00382
(0.00181) (0.00159)* (0.00184)** (0.00175) (0.00312)
Age Cubed -0.00003 -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00002
(0.00001)** (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001)** (0.00002)
Years of Education 0.04886 0.00147 0.01054 0.09754 -0.00524
(0.04098) (0.02854) (0.03726) (0.03121)*** (0.02431)
Male -0.15022 -0.12107 -0.25860 -0.24551 -0.19523
(0.11967) (0.10606) (0.11467)** (0.08354)*** (0.15979)
Income 0.08967 -0.01774 0.00669 0.03041 0.05745
(0.03889)** (0.02834) (0.02961) (0.02976) (0.04485)
Size of family -0.03495 -0.08632 0.01750 -0.02179 -0.10559
(0.03564) (0.03574)** (0.03561) (0.02524) (0.04449)**
Union Membership 1.56273 0.46016 0.48483 1.38822 0.11702
(0.41522)*** (0.47026) (0.51792) (0.42264)*** (0.45522)
More than 300 Employees -1.48855 3.38571 2.75075 -2.93518 0.50453
(1.46520) (1.44716)** (1.67166)* (1.21478)** (0.75777)
Observations 2266 2251 2250 2001 2474
Log-Likelihood -255.0180 -316.0122 -315.0138 -856.6905 -106.2078
Table 14: Other Employee Benefit Offerings in MEPS
Probit Regression Results
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the industry level in brackets.  *, **, and *** respectively denote significance at 
10%, 5% and 1%.  Coefficients for Race, Census region, MSA resident dummies and Constant term not shown. First Step Regression
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Table 15: Offer of Health Insurance and Health Insurance 
Characteristics: IV Estimates
Panel A: First Stage Regression Results
(1)














Fraction Paid by 
Firm
Second Step Regression Probit Tobit
(1) (2)










Size of Family -0.05673*** 0.00254
(0.00768) (0.00237)
Union Membership 0.01667 -0.00636
(0.13270) (0.01804)
Between 100 and 199 Employees -0.25958*** -0.18269*
(0.09178) (0.10188)
Between 200 and 299 Employees -0.15619** -0.06412
(0.07173) (0.08548)
Between 300 and 399 Employees -0.01491 0.20008*
(0.08284) (0.11683)
Between 400 and 499 Employees -0.22033 0.15220
(0.14962) (0.19127)






Notes: Standard errors clustered at the industry level in brackets. *, **, and ***
respectively denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%. Coefficients for Race,
Census region and MSA resident dummies not shown.
Panel B: Second Stage Regression ResultsSource: Hagist and Kotlikoff (2005) Table 2.  See their paper for the original sources of their data.
Figure 1: Per Capita Healthcare Expenditure of Different Age Groups Relative to 
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